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In advanced industrial economies, the service sector accounts for a large 
portion of each nation’s gross domestic product. Despite the increasing
importance of services trade, the multilateral trading system began establish-
ing rules to open markets in those sectors only in 1995, with the creation of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Decisions at the end of the round did
provide for continuing negotiations in the services area. Only with the
renewed commitment to a new round of trade negotiations, undertaken in
November 2001 at the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meet-
ings in Doha, Qatar, however, did serious individual sectoral negotiations go
into high gear.
The American Enterprise Institute is engaged in a research project to focus
on the latest round of trade negotiations on services. The project, mounted 
in conjunction with the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, the
Brookings Institution, and the U.S. Coalition of Service Industries, entails
detailed analyses of individual economic sectors: financial services,
accounting, insurance, energy, air transport—and now audiovisual and
entertainment services. Each study identifies major barriers to trade 
liberalization in the sector under scrutiny and assesses policy options for
trade negotiators and interested private-sector executives. This audiovisual
services study is being copublished with the Groupe d’Economie Mondiale
de Sciences Po, a Paris research institute headed by Patrick Messerlin, one of
the coauthors of the study.
AEI would like to acknowledge the following donors for their generous
support of the trade-in-services project: American Express Company,
American International Group (AIG), CIGNA Corporation, FedEx Corpora-
tion, Mastercard International, the Motion Picture Association of America,
and the Mark Twain Institute. I emphasize, however, that the conclusions and
recommendations of the individual studies are solely those of the authors.
CLAUDE BARFIELD
American Enterprise Institute 




Audiovisual Services are at the heart of globalization, and at the 
same time they are important carriers of individual cultures.
—United Nations Conference on Trade and Development1
The audiovisual services sector has changed significantly during the past
ten years. New technologies have stimulated the growth and develop-
ment of audiovisual services and products around the globe and offer
consumers worldwide access to a multitude of entertainment and infor-
mation services. As part of the explosion in information technology that
has taken place in the past decade, audiovisual services have played a role
in fostering many nations’ economic development, both through spread-
ing information and ideas and by promoting investment in the advanced
communications infrastructure of these nations. Electronically delivered
audiovisual products and services that increase the use of this infrastruc-
ture are helping to create an environment that will encourage investment
in the digital networks of tomorrow. 
Globalization and new technologies also have implications for the
amount of content available within a particular country. As services such
as cable television, video-on-demand, and direct satellite broadcasts
expand across borders, there is a need for content to fill the increasing
number of broadcast hours they supply. Although viewers generally pre-
fer local programs, if local programming is not available, it is inevitable
that broadcasters will depend on imported programs to fill airtime. (Note
that local and domestic programming are not the same thing. However,
imported programs can be substitutes for both local and domestic pro-
grams.) In particular, the dependence of subscription broadcasting on
foreign content is likely to remain high in the foreseeable future.
The United States is in a strong position to benefit from the increasing
demand to fill broadcast hours. In some countries, certain policymakers fear
that the overwhelming amount of U.S. products threatens cultural diver-
sity and will eventually homogenize the world’s cultures. To many people,2 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
“globalization means the Americanization of the world and the subjugation
of local cultures by the commercialism of Hollywood.”2 However, it is pos-
sible that those countries that recognize the strategic importance of foster-
ing strong creative industries can enhance their own cultural resilience and
benefit from globalization by encouraging the diversity that it promises. 
Defining the Audiovisual Services Sector
In general, the audiovisual services sector covers a wide range of activities
related to the production, distribution, and exhibition of audiovisual con-
tent such as motion pictures, radio and television programs, and sound
recordings. In the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), audiovisual services are defined under
the subsector of communication services.3 The GATS is the first and only
set of multilateral rules and commitments covering government measures
that affect trade in services. It covers all services, with two exceptions: serv-
ices provided in the exercise of governmental authority and, in the air
transport sector, air traffic rights and all services directly related to the exer-
cise of traffic rights. Table 1 illustrates the subcategories of the audiovisual
sector in the WTO in detail (and their associated listing under the United
Nations Provisional Central Product Classification [CPC]).
However, there is growing uncertainty about the very notion of audio-
visual services and their categorization within the context of new tech-
nologies. The United States has questioned the GATS classification of
audiovisual services under communication services, objecting that it does
not cover certain services, such as exhibition of films, operation of cine-
mas, and direct-to-home satellite services.4 Moreover, many of these sub-
categories may be too vague or too narrow with digitization and
convergence—which provide the potential for many kinds of digital con-
tent to be distributed over the same networks—and the emergence of
new electronic media. For example, radio and, to a certain extent, televi-
sion programs can be “streamed” over the Internet, and this type of
broadcast will be greatly increased by broadband networks. More and
more services may therefore be regarded as falling within the category
“Others.” With digital radio and television services enhanced by interac-
tive and multimedia features, it will no longer be possible to draw a clear
distinction between audiovisual services distributed through traditional
broadcasting networks and those distributed online Consequently a caseINTRODUCTION    3
can be made for clarifying the current subdivisions. However, the main
category “audiovisual services” has the advantage of not being linked to
any particular form of technology. It is open for new technological devel-
opments and will thus stand the test of time.
Market Access Control in the Audiovisual Services Sector
Measures used by countries to protect the sector from the international
market include content regulations, foreign ownership and control
restrictions, and tax incentives and government subsidies. These meas-
ures aim to promote and enhance national culture. They are usually
TABLE 1
AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES AND THEIR SUBCATEGORIES IN THE GATS
Category with subcategories  
CPC 9611  Motion picture and videotape production and distribution services
CPC 96111  Promotion or advertising services
CPC 96112  Motion picture or videotape production services
CPC 96113  Motion picture or videotape distribution services   
CPC 96114  Other services in connection with motion picture
and videotape production and distribution  
CPC 9612  Motion picture projection service   
CPC 96121  Motion picture projection services   
CPC 96122  Videotape projection services  
CPC 9613  Radio and television servicesa
CPC 96131  Radio services   
CPC 96132  Television services   
CPC 96133  Combined program making and 
broadcasting services  
CPC 7524  Radio, television, and transmission services   
CPC 75241  Television broadcast transmission services   
CPC 75242  Radio broadcast transmission services  
CPC n.a.   Sound recording  
No CPC  
specified Others (e.g., the contents of multimedia products)
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, Audiovisual Services, Background Note by the Secretariat,
S/C/W/40 (Geneva, 1998), 1–2.  As modified by authors. 
a. Especially for the subcategory radio and television services, it sometimes is difficult to determine
the exact boundary between services classified under telecommunications and those classified under
audiovisual services.4 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
underpinned by the preference within a country for domestically pro-
duced programming. 
Content Regulations. Content regulations, especially for television, 
are an important part of cultural policy in many countries. They can
ensure that local programs, as expressions of a country’s unique cultural
identity, have a place on television and are accessible to the community.
Content regulations can also foster the development of domestic pro-
duction industries, which create local programs. Local content regula-
tions for television typically restrict how much and at what times foreign
programming can be shown by broadcasters by prescribing a certain
percentage of local programming within the total amount of broadcast
time. In addition, some countries have explicit requirements regarding
the language used in programs broadcast on television and radio. 
Foreign Ownership and Control Restrictions. Many countries prohibit
foreign ownership and limit foreign investment in broadcast media, espe-
cially in television. They do this to ensure that their citizens have control
over broadcasting services. These restrictions reflect concerns about cul-
tural dominance by foreign interests and the need to safeguard and support
domestic cultural industries. It is argued that reserving ownership for a
country’s nationals will tend to facilitate local expertise in broadcasting,
with local owners more likely to employ local staff. This in turn is said to
contribute to the development of a local creative infrastructure and the rep-
resentation of local views in the media.
Tax Incentives and Government Subsidies. Population size and wealth
can limit the extent to which local producers are able to recoup produc-
tion costs in their domestic markets. Government assistance in the form
of tax incentives and subsidies goes some way in addressing the limited
capacity of domestic markets to support the development and produc-
tion of film and television products.
The Audiovisual Services Sector in the Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations concluded in
April 1994 and resulted in the GATS. The negotiation of the GATS was
the first time that trade in services, including audiovisual services, wasINTRODUCTION    5
brought within the ambit of multilateral trade rules. As discussed previ-
ously, the GATS covers the entire range of audiovisual services. The
framework of the GATS—made by various countries to liberalize their
current restrictions on trade in services—is divided according to four
modes of supply. These modes describe how services are delivered into
markets, and countries make commitments to remove (or maintain)
trade-limiting regulations against them. 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations on services, GATS concepts
were reviewed in terms of their applicability to audiovisual services. At that
time, strong disagreement emerged concerning the proposal to introduce a
“cultural exception” into the Agreement. The negotiations between the
United States and the European Community (EC) about the audiovisual
services sector were one of the key remaining differences preventing a set-
tlement on services. EC5 member states, particularly France, and other
countries, including Canada, India, and Australia, were opposed to U.S.
demands for liberalized trade in audiovisual services. The United States
argued that movies and television programs were commercial products just
like any other. The United States contended that the EC’s local content
rules for television, which provide that a majority of transmission time is
reserved for European works, unfairly imposed a market access barrier to
U.S. audiovisual products and cost U.S. producers potential export
income. The United States and other countries, including Japan, pressured
the EC to commit to dismantling the local content rules. 
The EC proposed a sectoral annex on audiovisual services aimed at
ensuring that WTO members would maintain their right to differentiate
among audiovisual products on the basis of their origin, that is, a dero-
gation from the most favored nation (MFN) principle. The annex would
have allowed for quantitative limitations (for example, screen time) and
for the application of local content requirements or the provision of sub-
sidies to locally produced services. 
Throughout the history of the GATS, audiovisual services have probably
been the most sensitive and most complex sector for negotiators. In fact,
“negotiations in this sector have been delaying for up to a year the accession
of a number of the newest WTO members.”6 At the end of the Uruguay
Round, these proposals by the EC for a “cultural exception” in the GATS pro-
voked a major crisis. When the United States refused, the European Union
(EU), Canada, India, and many other countries simply invoked MFN exemp-
tions on audiovisual services and did not schedule commitments in this sec-
tor. In fact, this sector is among those with the fewest commitments in GATS6 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
schedules. Cultural exceptions appear in regional (for example, NAFTA) and
bilateral (for example, Canada-Chile) trade agreements. 
The Latest Negotiation Proposals
Although no attempt was made to negotiate detailed sectoral trade rules
for audiovisuals during the Uruguay Round, WTO members have tabled
proposals regarding both the structure and content of the new negotia-
tions, which started at the beginning of 2000 (commonly known as
“Services 2000”). For example, Brazil7 and Switzerland8 tabled negotiat-
ing proposals on audiovisual services in 2001. 
Brazil made three interrelated proposals, suggesting that members do
the following:
• Make specific commitments in audiovisual services and, in
doing so, give special attention to audiovisual services in
which developing countries have great export potential (e.g.,
television services).
• Initiate a debate on subsidy schemes aimed at achieving
national policy objectives of promotion and preservation of
cultural identity and diversity. 
• Initiate a debate in the framework of the GATS 2000 on trade
defense and competition provisions to address unfair trade
practices and restrictive business practices in the audiovisual
services sector.
Brazil believes that the discussion on subsidies should take place in the
ongoing negotiations on trade distortive subsidies (under Article XV of the
GATS), and, given the disparities in members’ capacities to subsidize, it
should be ensured that such subsidies have the least trade distortive effect.
It stresses that subsidy disciplines might not be sufficient in themselves 
to create real competition in certain areas, such as in motion picture pro-
duction and distribution, in which the global market is characterized by an
oligopolistic structure. Furthermore, in its view, the question of transfer
pricing and the problem of placing audiovisual products on export mar-
kets at “dumping” price levels (because most of the production costs have
been recouped on the home market of the producing company) should beINTRODUCTION    7
seriously examined. Brazil argues that there seems to be a need to develop
trade defense mechanisms (for example, specific antidumping disciplines)
as well as competition disciplines in the audiovisual services sector.
Switzerland—referring to the fact that in the last services negotiations,
many delegations treated this sector as an “all-or-nothing” issue (requesting
full commitments or declining to make any)—seeks to start a debate that
could lead to a more balanced approach. Members’ individual concerns
should be the starting point, and possible solutions should be discussed.
The issues to be debated, in Switzerland’s view, should include a cultural
diversity safeguard, subsidies, public service, illicit content, competition
issues, other regulatory issues and market access, and national treatment
restrictions. On the basis of the debate, Switzerland would not preclude the
possibility of setting up a specific multilateral trade policy framework for
the audiovisual services sector.
The ongoing WTO round, referred to as the Doha Development
Agenda negotiations, is expected to take up the thorny cultural exception
issue again. The negotiations at the WTO would pit the conventional trade
liberalization argument against the logic of cultural exception. The objec-
tive of the next GATS round and others that will follow is to add new serv-
ices and sectors not previously listed under the commitments and to work
toward removing trade-limiting regulations that were maintained by
countries during previous rounds. The absence of commitments in broad-
casting services in the Uruguay Round is considered to adversely affect
one of the fastest growing distribution channels for U.S. audiovisual prod-
ucts.9 However, because of the agreed-upon mechanism of making sector-
specific offers and commitments, countries that have not scheduled any
commitments in relation to audiovisual services are not obliged to accede
to demands to do so. These countries reserve their right to impose new or
more burdensome measures that may have a trade-limiting effect without
penalty. Countries that have already included audiovisual services in
schedules will be expected to undertake further liberalization of markets
for these services. Countries that do not have cultural safeguards in place
are likely to be especially vulnerable to pressures to schedule their audio-
visual services sectors and commit to maintain open markets to foreign
suppliers and products.
In addition to GATS negotiations, trade liberalization in audiovisual
services is being exerted in other trade forums. The United States, for
example, has a policy of pursuing trade liberalization in audiovisual serv-
ices in bilateral treaties that it negotiates with other countries. 8 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
Maintaining a Restrictive Approach in the 
Audiovisual Services Sector? 
The global dynamics of broadcasting coupled with new media technolo-
gies are likely to exert even stronger pressures for open international
trade and the removal of domestic safeguard measures. As observed by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
Governments have traditionally used the licensing of broadcast-
ing facilities to ensure the implementation of policy goals in
respect to foreign and domestic content carriage. The restricted
electromagnetic spectrum available for analogue transmission
provided a technological rationale for the regulatory procedures
that underpinned these policy goals. However, with the greater
number of channels available for broadcasting which digital 
terrestrial over-the-air, satellite and cable technologies allow, 
the new environment makes a restrictive approach increasingly
difficult to justify.10
Issues of safeguarding cultural autonomy and cultural identity are inten-
sifying in an increasingly global environment. Audiovisual services indus-
tries, including television, film, disc, and video production, are organizing
on transnational lines. In this environment, free trade proponents argue that
there are important benefits from liberalizing audiovisual markets, espe-
cially for countries expanding new technologies and services. They argue
that liberalized trade fosters investment as well as encourages adoption of
new technologies and the development of more competitive domestic and 
foreign audiovisual services industries.11 In particular, they highlight the
domestic regulations that govern the movement of natural persons 
and investments, including foreign ownership and control regulations, as
significantly limiting market entry.
The Issues Addressed in This Study
This monograph, the sixth in the American Enterprise Institute’s series,
Studies on Services Trade Negotiations, addresses many issues posed by
the trends and developments within the area of trade in audiovisual serv-
ices and among trade negotiators. The three authors—Patrick A. Messerlin,INTRODUCTION    9
Stephen E. Siwek, and Emmanuel Cocq—discuss different aspects of
these issues. 
Stephen E. Siwek examines the options for a changing course toward
meaningful trade liberalization for entertainment products in the GATS. He
analyzes in detail the specific market access and national treatment com-
mitments made by the United States, Japan, and the EU in the audiovisual
services under the GATS (see tables 2–4). He emphasizes in particular the
role of positive commitments actually proposed by the trading partner,
because the elimination of MFN exemption does not reflect actual commit-
ments. He suggests the development of a wide-ranging negotiation strategy
(led by the United States) in order to accelerate success in the audiovisual
sector in the GATS. The following steps reflect Siwek’s changing course
toward trade liberalization for entertainment products in the GATS:
1. Develop a statistical dataset on content providers and owner-
ship of media infrastructure facilities such as multiplex cine-
mas and broadcast stations.
2. Identify limits on market access and national treatment and
prioritize new commitments from U.S. trading partners.
3. Initiate consultations under Article XV of the GATS in order to
assess the level of foreign tax support and identify emerging
subsidies.
4. Review MFN exemptions of “indefinite” duration with the
basic exemption principles in the GATS Annex. (Although the
GATS considers MFN exemptions to be temporary measures,
the EU characterizes its cultural exemptions to MFN as “indef-
inite.” However, indefinite subsidies in audiovisual products
contradict the basic policies of the GATS.)
5. Develop a reference paper that focuses on the distribution of
audiovisual products over the Internet. (Even though Siwek
argues that the Internet is not likely to become like television
in its role in mass media, he emphasizes that the Internet
requires active participation in its use.)
Patrick A. Messerlin and Emmanuel Cocq focus on the profound eco-
nomic changes (partly driven by technological changes) in importing
countries, including the large EC film market. They argue that there are10 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
good reasons for optimism, and the initiative on trade and culture
launched in the summer of 1999 by Canada (which pertains to the group
of countries hesitant about liberalization of audiovisuals) is a first, though
tenuous, sign of change. 
The European Common Audiovisual Policies (CAPs) are as highly pro-
tective as the EC agricultural policy—and they increasingly show the
same fatigue symptoms for essentially the same reasons. As a result, even
though the CAPs are losing support among the public, large audiovisual
firms, and regulatory agencies, which have some contact with markets,
the EC and member state authorities still support them. In this regard,
the authors provide a brief survey of the main instruments used by the
CAPs: quotas, subsidies, and government-made monopolies. They claim
that these instruments have balkanized EC audiovisual markets. The
authors have drawn the following conclusions based on their study of the
current status of the EC film markets:
•B r oadcast quotas should be eliminated not only because of the
usual static costs they impose on consumers, but also because
they segment European markets and will become increasingly
irrelevant with the coming technological changes.
• The policy frequently suggested currently in Europe (eliminate
quotas, but keep all the public subsidies) is inappropriate.
Existing policies (particularly in France) have shown that such
an approach has left aside the “cultural” goal that was sup-
posed to be the reason for subsidization. This has led to the
customary “industrial subsidies,” which have only succeeded
in making European films and audiovisual works clones of the
Hollywood productions.
• Eliminating industrial subsidies allows countries to concen-
trate on “cultural” subsidies, if they wish to do so. Defining
cultural subsidies (that is, some commonly agreed-upon rules
of competition) would be the key contribution of the reference




Meaningful Trade Liberalization for
Entertainment Products in the GATS
Stephen E. Siwek
Even in Uruguay, the audiovisual sector remained a discomforting guest
at the party. For services generally, the achievements of the Uruguay
Round were unprecedented (as described in the introduction). But when
the applause faded, the truth remained that in the GATS, the audio-
visual services sector had again been left behind. The benefits of the 
sector-specific commitments made by only thirteen U.S. trading partners
in audiovisual products do not offset the costs of perpetual discrimina-
tion and market limitation enshrined in the domestic policies of many
others. Indeed, the undeniable fact of continued government support for
discriminatory policies is neatly confirmed in the “indefinite” exemp-
tions to MFN treatment in this sector that are listed in the relevant GATS
schedules. More importantly, however, the MFN exemptions in audiovi-
sual products listed by particular trading partners reflect only that part
of the iceberg that is visible above the surface of the ocean. 
A trading partner’s decision to offer increased “market access” or
“national treatment” in the GATS is reflected not in MFN exemptions but
in the list of positive commitments actually proposed by that party.
Unfortunately, in audiovisual products, many U.S. trading partners have
either restricted or omitted entirely any positive commitment to liberal-
ize trade in this industry. For example, the EU excludes any direct men-
tion of audiovisual products in its list of specific commitments under the
GATS. The EU’s omission means that even if its MFN exemptions were
to be removed, U.S. films and television programs would still face broad-
cast quotas within all EU markets. Similarly, the schedule of specific
commitments listed by Japan for audiovisual products includes motion
picture and videotape production and distribution services but omits
any reference to television programming or transmission. For audiovisual12 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
products, the GATS today is hardly much of an improvement over the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before the Uruguay
Round. 
Yet, recent trends in the distribution of audiovisual services around 
the world may provide some basis for optimism that the past will not be
repeated. The recent emergence of the Internet as a potential medium
for the distribution of video entertainment raises a host of additional
issues for U.S. trade negotiators. In their policy statements relating to
the Internet, both the United States and the EC have emphasized a
“duty-free cyberspace” in order to encourage growth in global electronic
commerce (E-commerce).1 These parties have promised that the expan-
sion of E-commerce will be market led and that new legal and regulatory
barriers to the development of E-commerce will not be permitted.
However, these statements consistently omit any pledge to oppose 
the expansion of discriminatory subsidies and quotas to the Internet. In
its present form, the Internet has not yet achieved mass-market pene-
tration in any consumer market anywhere. More to the point, it is
extremely unlikely that the Internet will ever become a mass medium
like television. For this reason, even if a trading nation sought to deny
its people unfettered access to U.S. mass media, the enactment of subsi-
dies and quotas specific to the Internet would do little to achieve this
unfortunate goal. U.S. trading partners might nonetheless seek to
impose culturally based discriminatory policies on the Internet because
the Internet’s potential in other respects may be perceived as too impor-
tant to be left to the whims of the free market. By erecting the means to
discriminate indefinitely over the Internet on cultural grounds, U.S.
trading partners could seek to have the cake of “free cyberspace” and to
eat it too.
Comprehensive trade reform in the audiovisual services sector is long
overdue, and there are many issues that can be put on the table. Not all
of these issues are equal in economic importance or equally likely to pre-
vail. In addition, there are issues (such as cultural restrictions on Internet
distribution of audiovisual products) for which the timing seems right even
if the immediate impact is small. Accordingly, the United States should
consider a wide-ranging strategy for changing the course of trade policy in
the audiovisual services sector in the GATS.
First, the United States should develop comprehensive, country-by-
country statistics and growth trends on the number of screens, the num-
ber of television broadcast channels, the number of cable and satelliteCHANGING COURSE    13
TV outlets, and the ownership status of media distribution entities
around the world. Beyond the traditional content providers, these sta-
tistics should include data on ownership of media infrastructure facili-
ties such as multiplex cinemas and broadcast stations. The United States
should be armed with the right statistics to document how the world of
entertainment has changed since the Uruguay Round. 
Second, the United States should identify and prioritize the most bur-
densome limits on market access and national treatment that U.S. audio-
visual producers now face, with the goal of securing new commitments
in each such restriction in the upcoming GATS round.2 For example, the
United States might ultimately decide that Korea must make a specific
commitment to reduce its screen quotas in this round. Alternatively, the
United States could conclude that the EU must list a set of reduced
broadcast quotas for films and programs of EU origin in a new specific
commitment to improve market access under the GATS 2000. This
process of identification and prioritization should begin immediately. 
Third, consistent with its existing obligations, the United States
should consider a request for consultations with major trading partners
who maintain cultural subsidies of audiovisual products. These consul-
tations, permitted under Article XV of the GATS, should be initiated in
order to assess the level of foreign tax support that is earmarked for cul-
tural media in major foreign markets and to identify emerging subsidies,
particularly those that may offer discriminatory support for foreign
media distribution over the Internet. 
Fourth, the United States should consider challenging the continua-
tion of all MFN exemptions for audiovisual products, including exemp-
tions based on cultural considerations, in combination with its
proposals for improved market access and national treatment. In partic-
ular, MFN exemptions of “indefinite” duration should be contested on
the grounds that they are not consistent with the ten-year limits on MFN
exemptions suggested as a basic principle in the GATS Annex on such
exemptions. 
Fifth, the United States should develop and release a reference paper
that focuses on the distribution of audiovisual products over the
Internet. The reference paper should analyze with some specificity
whether and how the adoption of new policies specific to the Internet
that discriminate against U.S. audiovisual products on cultural grounds
might constitute a breach of the offending partner’s MFN, market access,
or national treatment obligations under the GATS. 14 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
Commitments and MFN Exemptions in the GATS
The GATS is the first ever set of multilateral, legally enforceable rules gov-
erning international trade in services. Like prior agreements on goods,
such as the GATT, the GATS contains a main text that addresses basic
principles and obligations, annexes dealing with rules for individual sec-
tors, and specific commitments by individual countries to provide access
to their markets. Unlike the GATT, the GATS has a fourth element: a set
of exemption lists showing where countries are “temporarily” choosing
not to apply the MFN principle of nondiscrimination. Importantly, the
schedules and the exemption lists are integral parts of the GATS. At the
time of the signature of the final act of the Uruguay Round on April 15,
1994, ninety-five schedules of specific commitments in services and sixty-
one lists of derogations from the MFN principle had been submitted and
agreed upon.3 In addition to MFN, the basic principles of the GATS
include national treatment, market access, transparency, and a commit-
ment to progressive liberalization through further negotiation. 
In the GATS, MFN and national treatment have distinct meanings.
The principle of MFN means treating one’s trading partners equally. By
contrast, national treatment refers to equal treatment for foreigners and
for one’s own nationals. Importantly, a nation can choose to discriminate
(at least temporarily) in its MFN obligations through the selective
allowance of national treatment to the products and services of some
trading partners but not to those of other trading partners. In the GATS,
a commitment to national treatment applies only when a country has
made a specific statement of that commitment, and exemptions to
national treatment are allowed.4 Departures from national treatment in
the GATS are supposed to be clearly stated, be based on clearly estab-
lished criteria, and service desirable policy objectives.5 In addition to
specific commitments to provide national treatment, trading partners
can make specific commitments to improve market access. Article XVI
of the GATS defines the following six types of mainly quantitative mar-
ket access restrictions that shall not be maintained or adopted in respect
to sectors in which market access commitments are undertaken unless
specified otherwise in the schedule of specific commitments:6
•L imitations on the number of suppliers.
•L imitations on the total value of service transactions or assets. CHANGING COURSE    15
•L imitations on the total number of service operations or on
the total quantity of service output. 
•L imitations on the total number of natural persons that may
be employed. 
• Measures that restrict or require specific types of legal entity
or joint venture.
•L imitations on the participation of foreign capital.7
Within each schedule of specific commitments, trading partners list par-
ticular commitments (or limitations) to national treatment and market
access in the following four discrete modes of supply:
•C r oss-border supply.
•C onsumption abroad.
• Commercial presence.
•P r esence of natural persons. 
Market Access and National Treatment 
Commitments in Audiovisual Services
Table 2 shows the GATS schedule of specific commitments made by the
United States in audiovisual services. In the schedule, audiovisual services
are divided into subsectors such as motion picture production and dis-
tribution services as well as radio and television services (for details, see
introduction, page 3). 
As shown in table 2, with the exception of radio and television services,
the United States reports no limitations on access to its market for the
audiovisual services of its trading partners. With respect to radio and
television services, the United States does list market access limitations
on the supply of audiovisual services requiring a commercial presence.
These limitations include the requirement that only U.S. citizens may
hold radio and television broadcast licenses as well as cross-ownership
restrictions on a single company’s ownership of newspapers and radio
and TV broadcast stations serving the same local market. As regards U.S.
limits on national treatment in audiovisual services, the U.S. schedule of
commitments mentions only that grants from the National Endowment16 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
TABLE 2
THE GATS SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES
Audiovisual services
sector or subsector Limitations on national treatmenta
Motion picture and videotape 1) Grants from the National Endowment for the
production and distribution Arts are only available for individuals with U.S.
citizenship or permanent resident alien status 
and nonprofit organizations.
2) None
3) Grants from the National Endowment for the
Arts are only available for individuals with U.S.
citizenship or permanent resident alien status  
and nonprofit organizations.
4) None








Radio and television 1) None
transmission services   2) None
3) None 
4) None








SOURCE: See United States International Trade Commission, “U.S. Schedule of Commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services” (USITC, May 1997), available at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/
reports/studies/GATS97.pdf.CHANGING COURSE    17












4) Unbound except as indicated in HORIZONTAL COMMITMENTS
1) None
2) None
3) A single company or firm is prohibited from owning a combination of news-
papers and radio and TV broadcast stations serving the same local market. 
Radio and television licenses may not be held by a foreign government; a 
corporation chartered under the law of a foreign country or that has a non-U.S.  
citizen as an officer or director or more than 20% of the capital stock of which is  
owned or voted by non-U.S. citizens; a corporation that is directly or indirectly 
controlled by a corporation of which more than 25% of capital stock is owned 
by non-U.S.citizens or a foreign government; or a corporation of which any  
officer or more than 25% of the directors are non-U.S. citizens.
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the HORIZONTAL SECTION. In addition, U.S.








4) Unbound, except as indicated in the HORIZONTAL COMMITMENTS 
a. Modes of supply: 1) cross-border supply, 2) consumption abroad, 3) commercial presence, and 4) pres-
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for the Arts are available solely to U.S. citizens, permanent resident
aliens, and nonprofit companies. 
For purposes of comparison, table 3 presents the GATS schedule of
specific commitments made by Japan in audiovisual services. Japan’s
schedule of commitments reports virtually no limits on market access or
national treatment for three subsectors in audiovisual products. 
TABLE 3
THE GATS SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS MADE BY JAPAN
Audiovisual services    Limitations on   Limitations on 
sector or subsector national treatmenta market accessa
Motion picture and  1) None 1) None
videotape production  2) None 2) None
and distribution  3) None except as 3) None  
services as indicated in   4) Unbound except 
HORIZONTAL  as indicated in 
COMMITMENTS HORIZONTAL
4) Unbound except COMMITMENTS
as indicated in 
HORIZONTAL 
COMMITMENTS
Motion picture  1) Unbound 1) Unbound
projection services 2) None 2) None
3) None except  3) None  
as indicated in   4) Unbound except 
HORIZONTAL  as indicated in 
COMMITMENTS HORIZONTAL
4) Unbound except  COMMITMENTS
as indicated in 
HORIZONTAL
COMMITMENTS
Sound recording services  1) None 1) None
2) None 2) None
3) None except  3) None  
as indicated in   4) Unbound except 
HORIZONTAL  as indicated in 
COMMITMENTS HORIZONTAL
4) Unbound except  COMMITMENTS
as indicated in 
HORIZONTAL
COMMITMENTS
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, “Japan: Schedule of Specific Commitments,” General Agreement
on Trade in Services, GATS/SC/46, April 15, 1994, 40–41.
a. Modes of supply: 1) cross-border supply, 2) consumption abroad, 3) commercial presence, and
4) presence of natural persons.CHANGING COURSE    19
These subsectors are motion picture and videotape production and
distribution services, motion picture projection services, and sound
recording services. The Japanese commitments do not extend, however,
to radio and television services or to radio and TV transmission services.
The failure on the part of the Japanese to make positive commitments in
these important subsectors again shows that in the GATS it is often not
what is listed but what is not listed that matters.8
The EU’s schedule of specific commitments in audiovisual products is 
not included here because the EU made no specific commitments in audio-
visual services (for details, see introduction, pages 5–6, as well as note 12 in
this chapter).9 For this reason, notwithstanding the efforts of U.S. nego-
tiators in the GATS, the EU’s market access restrictions in audiovisual
products, including the Community’s television broadcast quotas, remain
in effect today. Note that for purposes of these agreements, separate
nations within the EU are treated no differently than individual states with-
in the United States. As a result, the EU’s omission of specific commitments
in audiovisual products means that even if the EU’s MFN exemptions were
to be eliminated (see below), U.S. films and television programs would still
face broadcast quotas within all EU markets. 
MFN Exemptions in Audiovisual Services
Although films and television programs are considered to be services 
in the GATS, they have a long and unfortunate history as “goods” within
the context of the GATT. Article IV of the GATT specifically permitted the
establishment and maintenance of screen quotas designed to guarantee
that a minimum percentage of total screen time would be applied to the
exhibition of films of national origin.10 In many markets, U.S. distributors
have also faced trade barriers and quotas that restricted the number of
broadcast hours that could be devoted to American television programs.11
In one form or another, these discriminatory policies have remained in
force through the Uruguay Round and up to the present day.12 Yet now, as
in the past, major U.S. trading partners, including the EU and Canada,
continue to defend subsidies and quotas in media products on the basis
of subjective and nonquantifiable factors such as “cultural preservation” or
the promotion of a “regional identity.”13
Table 4 lists GATS exemptions to Article II (MFN) treatment for audio-
visual services reported by the EC and its member states. As with specific20 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
TABLE 4
THE EC AND ITS MEMBER STATES: MFN EXEMPTIONS IN AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES
Description of measure indicating 
Sector or subsector  its inconsistency with Article II 
Audiovisual services:  Measures that may be imposed in order to 
distribution of audiovisual works  respond to unfair pricing practices by certain 
third-country distributors of audiovisual works 
Audiovisual services Measures taken to prevent, correct, or 
counterbalance adverse, unfair, or unreason- 
able conditions or actions affecting EC audio- 
visual services, products, or service providers  
in response to corresponding or comparable  
actions taken by other members 
Audiovisual services:   Measures that define works of European origin 
production and distribution   in such a way as to extend national treatment 
of audiovisual works through   to audiovisual works that meet certain  
broadcasting or other forms of   linguistic and origin criteria regarding access 
transmission to the public  to broadcasting or similar forms of transmission
Audiovisual services:  Measures based on government-to-government 
production and distribution of  framework agreements (and plurilateral agree- 
cinematographic works and  ments) on coproduction of audiovisual works, 
television programs which confer national treatment to audiovisual 
works covered by these agreements, in particular, 
in relation to distribution and access to funding
Audiovisual services:   Measures granting the benefit of any support
production and distribution   programs (such as Action Plan for Advanced
of television programs and   Television Services, MEDIA, or EURIMAGES)
cinematographic works to audiovisual works, and suppliers of such 
works, meeting certain European origin criteria
Audiovisual services:   Waiver of the requirement in Spain to obtain 
distribution services  licenses for the distribution of dubbed films 
of non-Community origin, granted to films  
of European origin that are especially 
recommended for children’s audiences 
Audiovisual services:  Foreign participation in companies in Italy 
television and radio   exceeding 49% of the capital and voting rights,
broadcasting services subject to a condition of reciprocity 
Audiovisual services:    Measures taken in Denmark that are adopted 
production and distribution of   for the implementation of benefits in conformity
cinematographic works and television   with such support programs as the NORDIC 
programs in Nordic countries FILM and TV FUND in order to enhance 
production and distribution of audiovisual 
works produced in Nordic countries
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, “European Communities and Their Member States: Final List of Article II 
(MFN) Exemptions,” General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS/EL/31, April 15, 1994, 1–3.
NOTE: Agreements already exist or are being negotiated with the following countries: Algeria; Angola;CHANGING COURSE    21
Countries to which  Conditions creating  
the measure applies  Intended duration  the need for the exemption
All members  Indefinite  Unfair pricing practices may 
cause serious disruption to the
distribution of European works  
All members  Indefinite (the need  Need to protect the European
for exemption will  Communities and their member
lapse together with  states from adverse, unfair, or 
corresponding  unreasonable unilateral actions 
exemption from  from other members  
other members) 
Parties to the Council  Indefinite (exemption  The measures aim, within the 
of Europe Convention  needed for certain  sector, to promote cultural 
on Transfrontier Tele-    countries only until an  values both within EC member 
vision or other Euro- economic integration  states and with other countries 
pean countries with  agreement is concluded  in Europe, as well as achieving 
whom an agreement  or completed)  linguistic policy objectives
may be concluded 
All countries with   Indefinite  The aim of these agreements 
whom cultural    is to promote cultural links 
cooperation   between the countries 
may be desirable  concerned
(see note below)
European countries  Indefinite (exemption    These programs aim to preserve
needed for certain and promote the regional iden-
countries only until an  tity of countries within Europe 
economic integration  that have long-standing cultural
agreement is concluded  links
or completed) 
Parties to the Council  Indefinite (exemption  The measure aims to promote    
of Europe  needed for certain coun-  European cultural values and 
tries until an economic  linguistic policy objectives 
integration agreement is toward the youth
concluded or completed)
All countries  Indefinite  Need to ensure effective market
access and equivalent treatment
for Italian service suppliers
Finland, Norway,    Indefinite  Preservation and promotion of 
Sweden, and Iceland  the regional identity of the 
countries concerned
Argentina; Australia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Canada; Cape Verde; Chile; Côte d’Ivoire; Colombia; Cuba; Egypt;
Guinea Bissau; India; Israel; Mali; Mexico; Morocco; Mozambique; New Zealand; São Tomé e Principe;
Senegal; states in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe; Switzerland; Tunisia; Turkey; and Venezuela.22 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
commitments in the GATS, the MFN exemption lists divide audiovisual
services into subsectors. Unlike lists of specific commitments, however,
MFN exemptions require statements about the countries to which the
exemptions apply, their intended duration, and the conditions creating the
need for the exemption.
As shown in table 4, for many of its MFN exemptions, the EC intends
that these measures exist indefinitely. The EU’s MFN exemptions in
audiovisual services include both responsive measures needed to respond
to unfair pricing practices and other measures that discriminate (favor-
ably) in the application of national treatment to the audiovisual products
of other EU member states. The EU exemptions also include support pro-
grams for the supply of television programs and cinematographic works
that meet European origin criteria. These support programs, such as
Action Plan for Advanced Television Services, MEDIA, and EURIMAGES,
aim to preserve and promote the “regional identity of countries within
Europe which have long standing cultural links.” The EU’s intention to
promote cultural “links” within Europe also extends to measures that
define works of European origin for purposes of “access to broadcasting
or similar forms of transmission.”14
Table 5 provides GATS exemptions to MFN treatment for audiovisual
services reported by Canada. These measures focus on differential treat-
ment accorded to coproduction of films and television programs that
intend to improve the availability of Canadian and Québécois audiovisual
productions in Canada. As with the EC measures, the Canadian MFN
exemptions are intended to be applied indefinitely.
Perhaps not surprisingly, even the United States is not free from MFN
exemptions in audiovisual products. Table 6 provides excerpts from the
MFN exemption list of the United States for telecommunications services.15
The United States reports MFN exemptions in the one-way satellite trans-
mission of direct-to-home (DTH) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) tel-
evision services and of digital audio services.16
This exemption in DBSs appears to permit the United States to retain
the right to control which companies may broadcast from satellites into
U.S. territory. Press reports suggest that the U.S. measure was aimed at
Canada for refusing to relax certain restrictions on foreign ownership of
Canadian assets.17 Although it is possible to criticize the use of the GATS
as a forum for purely bilateral trade negotiations, the broader point is
that such focused restrictions are inherently less subjective than open-
ended MFN exemptions that are rationalized on the basis of a perceivedCHANGING COURSE    23
need to preserve a region’s cultural identity. Bilateral disputes are capa-
ble, at least in principle, of a quid pro quo kind of resolution. The
United States might, for example, remove these restrictions if Canada
revised its rules on national ownership. Short of outright abandonment
of a foreign market, is there a comparable set of focused actions that
would convince the EU or the Canadians to eliminate cultural barriers
in audiovisual products? If so, what might those actions be? A nation’s
inability, even in principle, to quantify the point at which it would con-
sider the removal of cultural barriers is, at heart, what makes such bar-
riers so pernicious. 
Industry Growth and Non-U.S. Stakeholders 
in Audiovisual Products
Despite the difficulties inherent in any attempt to remove or eliminate
cultural barriers in entertainment trade, all may not be doom and gloom
for audiovisual services. In recent years, many markets in the world have
experienced dramatic increases in the construction of new outlets for
audiovisual products. This global expansion in media outlets has been
driven by the widespread recognition on the part of both U.S. and non-
U.S. investors that many audiovisual markets have had inadequate facil-
ities to meet rising consumer demand. Although these construction
trends comprise many types of audiovisual outlets, including multi-
channel cable television and satellite facilities, the recent boom can be
seen most clearly in the worldwide growth of multiplex cinemas. 
In June 1999, for example, the Commission Départementale d’Equipe-
ment Cinématographique (CDEC), a French regional cinema commission
just outside Paris, approved three multiplex projects. One project in Torcy
(18 screens, 3,750 seats) was proposed by a U.S. firm, AMC Entertainment;
however, the other two projects, in Chelles (14 screens, 2,850 seats) and
Claye-Souilly (14 screens, 3,850 seats), were proposed by the non-U.S.
firms Village Roadshow of Australia and Pathé of France.18 In the same
period, CDECs in two other regions in France also approved multiplex pro-
posals by Pathé and Village Roadshow. Although these projects may bene-
fit U.S. audiovisual distributors, there is no doubt that they benefit
non-U.S. interests as well. 
Indeed, the ongoing growth in the construction of multiplex cinemas
has not been limited to France. Peter Ivany, chief executive of Hoyts24 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
Corp. (another Australian company), recently estimated that if all cinema
building goes forward as planned, “some 20,000 multiplex screens will
be built worldwide in the next five to seven years at a cost of $10 billion
to $15 billion.”19 Other non-U.S. multiplex leaders include Kinepolis of
Belgium, Golden Harvest of Hong Kong, and Ster Kinekor of South
Africa.20
The ongoing proliferation of movie screens around the world clearly
provides more locations for both foreign and locally produced films to be
viewed side by side. For this reason, in many foreign markets, local or
regional films may now be able to achieve widespread exhibition even
with free and unconstrained competition from U.S.-produced films. In
addition, as noted above, many of the owners of these emerging multiplex
cinemas are non-U.S. based. These non-U.S. firms will benefit from future
increases in consumer demand for movies in foreign markets because
demand for movies translates into demand for multiplex cinemas. And the
maximum demand for movies in a given market can only be established
TABLE 5
CANADA: MFN EXEMPTIONS IN AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES
Sector or Description of measure indicating
subsector its inconsistency with Article II
Film, video, and television   Differential treatment is accorded to works 
programming coproduction coproduced with persons of countries with  
which Canada may have coproduction agree-
ments or arrangements and to natural persons 
engaged in such coproduction
Film, video, and television Differential treatment is accorded to works copro-
programming coproduction   duced with persons of countries with which 
and distribution Québec may have coproduction arrangements
and to natural persons engaged in such copro- 
ductions as well as to natural and juridical persons 
engaged in film and video distribution pursuant 
to bilateral arrangements for the distribution of  
film, video, and television programming in its  
territory
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, “Canada: Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions,” General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS/EL/16, April 15, 1994, 1–5.CHANGING COURSE    25
in a free and unrestricted market. For this reason, emerging non-U.S.
firms that invest in or benefit from free trade in audiovisual products may
represent new stakeholders in the long-running debate over trade in
audiovisual products. These non-U.S. firms clearly benefit from free trade
in audiovisual products. 
Limitations on Market Access and National Treatment 
A trading partner’s decision to offer increased “market access” or
“national treatment” in the GATS is reflected not in MFN exemptions but
in the list of positive commitments actually proposed by that party. For
this reason, even if, for example, the EU were to remove its listed MFN
exemptions in audiovisual products, U.S. films and television programs
would still face broadcast quotas within all EU markets. As a result, U.S.
negotiators should be particularly well versed in the market access
Countries to which Intended Conditions creating 
the measure applies duration the need for the exemption
All countries  Indeterminate For reasons of cultural policy, including to
improve the availability of Canadian audio-
visual productions in Canada, to promote
greater diversity among foreign audiovisual
works on the Canadian market, and to pro-
mote the international exchange of audio-
visual works
All countries  Indeterminate For reasons of cultural policy, including to
improve the availability of Québécois audiovi-
sual productions in Québec, to promote 
greater diversity among foreign audiovisual  
works on the Québec market, to promote the 
international exchange of audiovisual works,  
and to ensure that Québec distributors have 
improved access to films originating from all 
parts of the world while allowing partners in  
film distribution arrangements to continue  
to distribute in Québec films for which they 
are recognized as the producers or the hold-  
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restrictions that actually apply in markets where positive commitments
to provide market access in audiovisual products are conspicuous in
their absence. 
Markets that restrict U.S. audiovisual products exist in all regions of
the world. In Korea, for example, cinemas are required to show Korean
films 146 days out of the year on each screen, amounting to 40 percent
of the year.21 In Italy, published legislation imposes “seat and screen”
quotas linked to the authorization required for new theaters under con-
struction that exceed a seating capacity of 1,300.22 In Indonesia, the
Ministry of Information sets annual import quotas that restrict European
and North American films.23 In Australia, 50 percent of programming
broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and midnight must be of Australian ori-
gin.24 In Canada, all over-the-air television broadcasters must program at
least 60 percent of their annual broadcast time with programming certi-
fied as Canadian content.25 In China, there is evidence of an unwritten
system of quotas for films, video, and television.26 In addition to all of
these examples, as discussed in the next section, the EU imposes
European quotas on television broadcasting to all member states, which
will be extended to Central and Eastern European countries as they apply
for EU membership. Clearly, U.S. negotiators will face many markets
where restrictions and barriers to audiovisual products can and should be
TABLE 6
THE UNITED STATES: EXCERPTS FROM THE MFN EXEMPTION LIST FOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
Description
of measure Countries  Conditions
indicating its to which  creating the
(Private) sector inconsistency the mea- Intended need for the
or subsector with Article II sure applies duration exemption
Telecommuni- Differential treat- All Indefinite Need to ensure
cation services: ment of countries substantially
One-way satellite due to application full market 
transmission of of reciprocity mea- access and 
DTH and DBS sures or through national treat-
television services international agree- ment in certain
and of digital  ments guaranteeing markets
audio services market access or
national treatment
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, “The United States of America: List of Article II (MFN)
Exemptions, Supplement 2,” GATS/EL/90/Suppl.2, April 11, 1997, 2.CHANGING COURSE    27
identified. Ultimately, however, at the end of the negotiations, the chal-
lenge may be to narrow these targets to those where real progress can be
achieved immediately. 
Consultations on Audiovisual Subsidies
As noted earlier, the EU’s audiovisual support programs such as MEDIA
have been listed by the EC as “indefinite” exemptions to the MFN princi-
ple in the GATS. The idea that the EC should endeavor to support a
European audiovisual industry dates back to the 1980s. In the latter part
of that decade, Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission,
committed the EU to the view that “culture [by which he meant European
rather than French or German culture] is not merchandise like other com-
modities and it should not be treated as such.”27 On the basis of this view,
in 1989, Delors proposed a program of assistance to European television
and film production endowed with 250 million ECUs (250 million euros)
over five years.28 This endowment later became MEDIA. The MEDIA pro-
gram adopted by the EC in December 1990 did not aim to subsidize film
production directly. Instead, it sought to subsidize so-called “support”
functions such as pilot projects, research, training, and exchange programs.
Subsequently, in 1995 the EC proposed, and in December 1995 adopted,
the MEDIA II program (1996–2000), which again focused on structural
subsidies for development, distribution, and training in audiovisual works.
The EC eventually allocated 310 million ECUs to MEDIA II.29
In a related development, on October 3, 1989, the EC adopted the
Television Without Frontiers (TWF) directive, which held that the member
states should ensure “where practicable and by appropriate means that broad-
casters preserve a majority proportion of their transmission time for
European works” (emphasis added).30 Under the EC directive, the defini-
tion of “European” programs was complex. European content was deter-
mined on the basis of control of production, not on the basis of the source
of material, directors, actors, or location. As a consequence, American stu-
dios could not generally expect their productions to qualify as European,
except through coproduction. Even though certain member states have
chosen to interpret liberally the “where practicable” caveat within the TWF
directive, the directive remains at the heart of the EC’s MFN exemptions,
which define works of European origin for purposes of “access to broad-
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In its GATS schedule, the EC clearly recognized that the Community’s
audiovisual subsidies and quotas were and are inconsistent with the MFN
provisions of the Agreement. What seems to have been ignored, at least in
the public debate, is that under the GATS, all MFN exemptions are to be
reviewed after five years (in 2000) and should last no longer than ten
years.31 Whereas the GATS defines MFN exemptions as temporary meas-
ures, the EC characterized its cultural exemptions to MFN as “indefinite.”
Furthermore, the idea of unending MFN exemptions in audiovisual prod-
ucts was not limited to the Europeans. As already stated, both the Canadian
and American MFN exemptions are also “indefinite” in duration. 
The United States should consider a request for consultations regarding
all indefinite subsidies in audiovisual products. Under Article XV, the
United States should consider whether to seek to assess the level of foreign
tax support that is earmarked for cultural media in major foreign markets
under these subsidies and to identify emerging subsidies, particularly those
that may offer discriminatory support for foreign media distribution over
the Internet. The United States might attempt simply to end the most egre-
gious of its indefinite subsidies (particularly in connection with Internet
distribution of audiovisual products) and subsequently, if needed, include
this as part of GATS negotiations in 2005. As a fallback position, the United
States might simply raise these issues in order to negotiate more favorable
terms on other issues such as market access and national treatment. The
point remains, however, that indefinite subsidies in audiovisual products
contradict the basic policies of the GATS. 
In this context, also note that not only will the elimination of cultural
subsidies benefit the foreign taxpayers who support these subsidies, but it
will also benefit foreign producers and creators, who cannot now take full
advantage of these subsidy programs. Not even cultural ministers can cred-
ibly deny that for the vast majority of products and services produced and
distributed around the globe, market performance in a free market will gen-
erally exceed market performance in a subsidized market. World markets
for films and television programs are not exceptions to this basic fact of life.
Despite Delors’ claims, films and television programs are commodities
because they are subject to the laws of supply and demand. For this reason,
in a subsidized media market, subsidy recipients likely will not include the
correct mix of young and newly emergent creators who might otherwise
revolutionize local television and film production in that market.32 U.S.
trade negotiators should not lose sight of these disenfranchised creators with
whom they share a common goal. The forces of change and excellence inCHANGING COURSE    29
the film and television production industries of our trading partners do not
always rise to the top in systems of quotas and subsidies. 
Eliminating MFN Exemptions While Improving Market Access
The United States should develop a comprehensive set of proposals that
combines the outright elimination of MFN exemptions, including cultural
exemptions, for audiovisual products with the market access commitments
discussed previously. Although market access and national treatment com-
mitments may provide greater economic benefits, the United States should
not abandon the argument that MFN exemptions to the GATS are inher-
ently temporary in nature. Obviously, such a set of combined proposals
would also mean that the United States itself could no longer use the GATS
to force changes in Canadian foreign ownership rules (through restrictions
on DBS transmissions) or Canadian tax laws (through differential treatment
of tax deductions for broadcast advertising). Nevertheless, the end of MFN
exemptions (in strict combination with new market access rights for audio-
visual products) would likely lead to real economic benefits for U.S. film
and television program creators and distributors. 
For example, absent television subsidies and quotas, it is reasonable to
conclude that the prices paid to U.S. television producers by European
broadcasters would increase. No longer facing limits on the quantity of
American programs they could air, European broadcasters would tend, all
else being equal, to bid up the prices they would be willing to pay for U.S.
programs. Additional benefits could result from changes in the mix of pro-
grams aired during prime time and from changes in the total programs 
purchased as European broadcast markets expanded. Beyond these consid-
erations, absent subsidies and quotas, European consumers would be able to
view the imported and domestic television programs that they really wanted
to see. Free markets benefit consumers even in audiovisual products. 
Cultural Discrimination and the Internet
In their policy statements relating to the Internet, both the United States
and the EC have emphasized the benefits of a “duty-free cyberspace.”33
Mindful of the promise of E-commerce, these nations have agreed that the
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initiative. The United States and the EC have stated, “The role of govern-
ment is to provide a clear, consistent and predictable legal framework to
promote a procompetitive environment in which electronic commerce can
flourish and to ensure adequate protection of public interest objectives,
such as privacy, intellectual property protection and public safety.”34 Thus,
at the moment, the public interest objectives to be promoted over the
Internet do not appear to include cultural preservation or the need to main-
tain a regional identity. Nevertheless, using even current digital technology,
“virtually any image can be digitized, including books, newspapers, paint-
ings, movies, TV programs, music, personal conversations, speeches, polit-
ical cartoons, brainwaves, and three-dimensional objects.”35
The United States and the EC have concluded that “unnecessary exist-
ing legal and regulatory barriers [affecting E-commerce] should be elimi-
nated and that the emergence of new ones should be prevented.”36 Yet,
paradoxically, in 1997, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced a
government initiative to accelerate his country’s use of the World Wide
Web. Specifically, Jospin described government subsidies to bring content
from existing print media onto the Web and to support Internet-based tax
payments, car ownership renewals, and employment searches.37 More
recently, when America Online (AOL) announced it would merge with
Time Warner, it “stirred fear in France and elsewhere that the United States
will secure an even greater cultural sway in the future by determining what
Europeans will be able to see over the new medium.”38 In a world of “dig-
ital convergence,” it seems only fair to ask whether the procompetitive,
deregulatory commitments made by the United States and the EC will
extend to audiovisual products and services that may be provided over or
as part of the Internet. As of this writing, there is no clear evidence to sug-
gest that they do, and that is precisely the point. If there is no clear evidence
to suggest that our trading partners support an Internet that remains free
of cultural restrictions, it is incumbent upon the United States to put that
evidence in place. Now is the time to do this. 
There are both technical and demand-related reasons to distinguish the
Internet from traditional mass media. Despite its technical flexibility, “the
Internet is optimized for e-mail and data files. . . . ”39 Using the Internet
also requires both a computer and a personal desire to be entertained
through the active participation in a medium. Television watching requires
neither. For these reasons, in its present form, it is extremely unlikely that
the Internet will ever become a mass medium like television.40 If the
Internet is not destined to become a mass medium, then one need notCHANGING COURSE    31
worry that the Internet will ever “threaten” the culture of a trading partner
or region. Indeed, even if a trading nation sought to deny its people unfet-
tered access to U.S. mass media, the enactment of subsidies and quotas
specific to the Internet would do little to achieve this unfortunate goal. 
How then could our trading partners rationalize cultural restrictions
on the Internet? Suppose that, over time, the Internet evolves to become
one of many media over which audiovisual products may be distributed
to a few selected users. These few users would need high-capacity
telecommunications links and specialized data storage devices. Except
for these users, the Internet could be characterized (incorrectly as it turns
out) as “a similar form of transmission” to broadcasting. In this scenario,
policymakers who may have other reasons to regulate the Internet could
then ignore the interactive, non–mass market character of the Internet.
Indeed, one can readily imagine an information minister who decides that
the potential of the Internet for E-commerce is too important to be left to
the whims of the free market. What better way to assert government 
control over this emerging medium than to impose access restrictions
based on the subjective need to promote cultural or regional identity. By
enacting access restrictions or other means of cultural discrimination for the
Internet, our trading partners could seek to have the cake of “free cyber-
space” and to eat it too. 
In describing the Global Electronic Commerce initiative, U.S. officials
observed that the principle of tariff-free cyberspace “needs to be established
quickly, before nations impose tariffs and vested interests mobilize to pro-
tect those tariffs.”41 The same argument applies here. The Internet should
be kept free of the myriad quotas, access restrictions, and subsidies that
have plagued the audiovisual sector throughout the twentieth century. If
the United States fails to act, the result could easily be the imposition of
new means of discrimination in the emerging digital technologies that will
flourish in the century to come. 32
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Preparing Negotiations in Services: 
EC Audiovisuals in the Doha Round 
Patrick A. Messerlin and Emmanuel Cocq
Introduction
Under the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement, only nineteen WTO mem-
bers have made commitments in audiovisual services in their GATS
schedule (see table 7). 
As illustrated in table 7, these commitments are generally of limited
scope and magnitude.1 Among the large audiovisual producers, only the
United States has taken substantial commitments at the various stages of
audiovisual production, distribution, and transmission. Although more
limited, the commitments by India (the world’s largest film producer),
Hong Kong, and Japan show the acceptance by countries with large pro-
duction and influential cultures to consider the issue of liberalization in
audiovisual services with an open mind. The rest of the WTO members,
led by the EC, have severely limited the access to their markets because
they are insecure about the ability of their audiovisual industry to com-
pete, they want to minimize the exposure of their people to foreign influ-
ence (France), or they want to use audiovisual services as an instrument
for building their national identity (Australia and Canada).
If negotiations for services followed the same pattern as those for goods,
WTO negotiators would try to solve such conflicting approaches among
WTO members by striking intersectoral trade-offs. For instance, the EC water
utilities or Canadian lumber firms would lobby their own authorities for
removing EC or Canadian barriers in audiovisuals (as concessions to be
granted for getting better access to U.S. water or lumber markets), whereas
the U.S. audiovisual services sector would lobby the U.S. government for the
opening of maritime transportation (as concessions to be traded for getting
better access to EC or Canadian audiovisual markets). However, these inter-
sectoral trade-offs may be a component of WTO negotiations in services, but
probably not to the same extent as in goods. As a result, the inclusion ofPREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    33
audiovisuals as one of the services to be liberalized during the Doha Round
has so far been received by skepticism in WTO circles.
However, there are good reasons for optimism, as stressed in the post-
script (see page 54), and recent developments in audiovisuals have con-
firmed this view. Optimism flows from ongoing profound economic
changes, partly driven by technological changes. These changes are largely
TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS IN AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES
UNDER THE URUGUAY ROUND
Countries
Large producers (by decreasing number of films produced)        
India  X     1   
United  States X X  X  X X  X  6     
Hong Kong  X     X  X  3   
Japan  X  X    X   3  
Smaller producers          
Central African Republic X  X  X  X  X  X  6  
Dominican Republic X   X  2   
El Salvador     X   X  2   
Gambia  X  X  X  X    4   
Israel  X       1   
Kenya  X  X      2   
Korea  X     X   2   
Lesotho  X  X  X  X    4   
Malaysia X    X    2   
Mexico  X  X      2   
New Zealand  X  X  X  X   X  5   
Nicaragua  X  X      2   
Panama  X  X  X   X   4   
Singapore  X     X   2   
Thailand  X   X    2  
Total 17  10  7  8  7  6  55   
SOURCE: World Trade Organization, Audiovisual Services, Table 9 S/C/W/40 (Geneva: WTO, 1998).
NOTE: CPC: Central Product Classification.
Film and video produc-
tion and distribution
CPC: 96112, 3
Radio and TV services










CPC: 96121, 234 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
procompetitive and require larger markets, including in the EC, which is
the focus here. Meanwhile, the highly protective European Common
Audiovisual Policies (CAPs) increasingly show the same fatigue as EC
agricultural policy—broadly for the same reasons—and face a significant
erosion of public support. All these converging forces make the option of
market opening in the audiovisual services sector increasingly attractive.
Audiovisuals in the Doha Round: Mission Impossible?
Reciprocity—the traditional negotiating tool in trade rounds—will be of
limited use for services, including audiovisuals. First, it cannot be easily
measured. Negotiators have no tools to assess whether liberalizing audio-
visual services will be worth roughly the same value as, for example, lib-
eralizing maritime transport or water utilities. (In the case of goods,
evaluating the concessions received and granted relies on the tariff reduc-
tions received and granted, weighted by the trade values involved.) 
Second, reciprocity has a much vaguer meaning in services than in goods.
Removing a tariff is often enough to change substantially pricing behav-
ior, entry, and exit in product markets. This is not necessarily the case for 
services, for which liberalization requires deep domestic regulatory reforms.
Difficulties for negotiators do not start with considerations about cul-
ture. They emerge in the very first steps of evaluating the concessions
offered by the various trading partners, and they are common to all serv-
ices. For instance, reliable data on imports require “rules of origin,”
which allow a clear distinction between imported and domestic products
and between products imported from different countries. Such a concept
is not easily applicable to all services, including audiovisual services. For
instance, defining a “domestic” film is not a simple matter, and differ-
ences in definitions can lead to huge differences when assessing the scope
and evolution of the audiovisual services sector. The French Centre
National de la Cinématographie (CNC) has three alternative rules of ori-
gin for defining French films: “French-initiative films,” which include
“100 percent French films” and “French majority co-productions”;
“Foreign majority co-productions”; and “approved films.” From 1997 to
2001, an average of 108 films were produced under the narrower defini-
tion (100 percent French films) and an average of 150 films were produced
under the wider definition (approved films). Rules of origin are so complex
that they can easily lead to arbitrary decisions, recently illustrated by ThePREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    35
Fifth Element, which was defined as an integrally French movie because it
had been largely financed by a French studio. However, it was shot in
London and in English, and employed many non-French actors—all
infringements to normal conditions for obtaining status as an integrally
French movie (in fact, there is an ongoing legal suit against this decision
to grant French origin).
Moreover, negotiations in audiovisual services present specific obsta-
cles, the most prominent being the strong link perceived between audio-
visual services and “national culture” by many GATS members. However,
the paradox is that the existing regulatory policies that allegedly support
national culture tend to harm it profoundly. For instance, the French
audiovisual policy has strongly induced French filmmakers to mimic U.S.
filmmakers, leading to an accelerated “Americanization” of French cul-
ture. The fact that this paradox is increasingly perceived in Europe
removes an obstacle to liberalization.
In such a delicate context, negotiators will be strongly pressured by
audiovisual firms, which are very diverse. Whereas some of these companies
operate almost exclusively in the audiovisual services sector of their coun-
tries (such as publicly owned audiovisual firms), others have internal poten-
tial sectoral trade-offs. For example, Bertelsmann is a large German-based
press firm that owns a large audiovisual services sector in several OECD
countries. The same could still be said for Vivendi, a French firm, although
there are doubts about the long-term sustainability of its strategy.
Technological and Economic Changes: The Quantum Project2
Technology is profoundly changing audiovisual markets, inducing the
most dynamic EC firms to make drastic revisions to their strategies—to
the point of being much more open to unilateral regulatory reforms.
Following is a quick survey of these changes.
As is well known, technical progress in telecoms is generating profound
changes in audiovisuals, and this convergence process is far from over. The
digital revolution in telecoms will reduce a government’s ability to protect
domestic audiovisual markets. For instance, the EC quota on non-European
movies on TV (40 percent of all broadcast movies) will become obsolete
when EC TV viewers are able to download movies at a reasonable cost from
a satellite dish through the Internet or from terrestrial digital TV, allowing
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will make it possible for each EC broadcaster to fulfill the current obliga-
tion of permanently supplying 40 percent of domestic films (if only by buy-
ing audiovisual flops produced in large quantities by the massive subsidies
available in the CAPs), whereas European TV viewers will download only
foreign films supplied by this company.
Technological change has generated economic changes. It has forced EC
firms willing to survive as world players to reassess the contours of the 
markets relevant to them and to realize that they are too small in global
markets. Table 8 shows that in 1997 the average size (in terms of audiovi-
sual turnover) of the twenty-three largest EC firms was half the average size
of the fifteen largest U.S. firms.
Size matters in the audiovisual services sector because it is one of the
riskiest parts of a modern economy. A large firm can implement several
strategies of risk management more easily than a smaller firm. These
strategies can include launching several films (hoping that the profitable
ones will compensate for the losses of the others); releasing films on
video, DVD, and other formats; and marketing brands by using the same
concept in, for example, a film, a TV series, a book, a magazine, clothes,
and toys (to increase revenues).
Table 8 suggests that EC firms are significantly more specialized in audio-
visual services and hence more fragile during the inevitable downturns. It
also suggests that EC firms tend to be smaller and less diversified in the EC
member states enforcing the most restrictive CAPs. This correlation mirrors
a true causality. Most EC protectionist measures in audiovisual services have
consisted of taxing consumers or creating monopolies—two sure recipes for
inhibiting market growth. The more strictly the CAPs have been enforced,
the more the markets have been severely segmented and restrained, or
balkanized, and the smaller the EC firms have tended to be. Moreover, the
fact that size counts much less for “cultural” films and TV shows (such works
tend to require less funds, making their risks more easily bearable) implies
that most EC firms are too small for entertainment and too big for culture.
However, because EC audiovisual firms tend to be monopolies in mem-
ber state markets, they have become the target of the European competi-
tion authorities for “abuse of dominant power.” Mergers in EC audiovisual
services represent 2 percent of the total number of EC mergers, but the
ban of mergers in audiovisual services by EC competition authorities
amounts to half of all the merger bans decided. Similar observations can
be made at the member state level. For instance, the largest French firm
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list of films on which it can levy fees for intellectual property rights)
because (in accordance with the existing audiovisual regulations) the rel-
evant market has been defined by the French competition authorities 
as the French-speaking film market, that is, 40 percent of the French 
market—a small proportion of an already relatively small market by world
TABLE 8
COMPARISONS OF LEADING U.S. AND EC AUDIOVISUAL FIRMS, 1996–1997
1997/
Country 1996 1997 1997  1996 1997  1997 1997  1997        
The 23 European firms among the 50 leading world firms        
Austria      
(1 firm) 942 818 818  --13.2  100.0 26.5  3.2  101.0
Britain    
(7 firms) 14,927 27,081 17,170 15.0  63.4 1,504.3  8.8 293.5
France      
(4 firms) 6,085 5,896 5,602 --7.9 95.0  353.1 6.3 96.4
Germany      
(7 firms)a 19,177 27,872 18,904  --1.4  67.8 1,169.8  6.2 230.8
Italy      
(2 firms) 5,049 4,855 4,855 --3.8  100.0  476.8 9.8 84.9
Luxembourg
(1 firm) 2,683 3,189 2,910  8.5 91.3  --80.6  --2.8 nsb
Netherlandsc
(1 firm) 5,628 5,686 5,686  1.0  100.0  403.3 7.1  277.4
All   54,491 75,397 55,945  2.7  74.2 3,853.2  6.9 196.6
All in 1996
(23 firms)  53,356 72,890 54,269  1.7  74.5 3,234.9  6.0 190.7
The 15 U.S. firms among the 50 leading world firms         
All   64,557 230,583  73,491  13.8  31.9 14,009.4  19.1  279.4   
All in 1996   
(13 firms)  49,055 95,365 63,416 29.3  66.5 4,653.2  7.3 241.1
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1999 (Strasbourg, France), 69.
a. Net results are not available for Kirch, RTL, and SAT1. 
b. Not significant. 
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standards. In summary, EC firms have been kept smaller than they could
have been because CAPs balkanize national markets.
Despite their small size and their inability to grow because of market
balkanization, EC audiovisual firms have been a good buy for other
firms because of their monopoly rents. Most of them have thus become
integrated in companies involved in other activities, for instance, press
and publishing (Bertelsmann, Canal Plus-Havas, Fininvest, and Kirch),
advertising (Canal Plus-Havas and Fininvest), insurance (Fininvest),
telecoms (Bertelsmann), and utilities (Canal Plus-Vivendi).
The recent integration of EC audiovisual firms in larger firms with a
wider set of production activities is dramatically changing the balance of
coalitions that could support the Doha Round. Being a profound departure
from the traditional European scheme of public monopolies highly spe-
cialized in audiovisual services, it is likely to influence the debate about cul-
ture in two ways. First, it enlarges the vision about “cultural goods,”
fudging the economically wrong (but politically powerful) debate about
trade balances. For instance, today, the negative EC trade balance in films
is a powerful argument for protection (even though economically it does
not make sense). A wider view about all cultural goods produced by firms
like Bertelsmann or Vivendi will balance the negative EC trade balance in
films by the positive EC trade balance in books or magazines, helping to
diffuse the pressures on cultural protection. Second, EC firms looking for
access to foreign markets for their nonaudiovisual activities will be less hos-
tile to the opening of EC audiovisual markets. Most of the large European
groups owning audiovisual firms are in such a situation.
Audiovisual Services in the EC: Titanic
This section provides a brief survey of the main instruments—quotas
and subsidies—used by the CAPs and an economic analysis of their
effects. Although it draws many examples from France, it reflects the
overall situation in the EC for two reasons. First, almost all other EC
member states (including “free trade–minded” countries, such as Britain)
have adopted or maintained audiovisual measures relatively similar to
the French ones.3 Second, the complex process of generating European,
“supra-national” regulations is further eroding differences among mem-
ber states. For instance, in November 1998, the French TV regulator
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French legal constraints on TV channels from other EC member states
but to submit them to the EC regime.
Quotas:  A bout de souffle. The Television Without Frontiers (TWF)
European Directive (adopted in 1989 and amended on June 30, 1997 by
the European Directive 97/36/EC) imposes “broadcast” quotas based on
film nationality. It stipulates “that broadcasters reserve for European works
. . . a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time
appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and
teleshopping.” The Directive, however, specifies that “member-states shall
ensure this principle where practicable and by appropriate means.”4 These
quotas are rigidly enforced in certain member states (for example, France)
and more subtly implemented in the other member states—but not neces-
sarily with less consequences, as best illustrated by the almost identical
shares of U.S. fiction TV shows in Britain and France.5
Broadcast quotas are combined with other quantitative restrictions in
certain member states. In France, for instance, “global” quotas limit the
total number of films that can be broadcast per year, and time-specific quo-
tas prohibit the broadcasting of films on most TV channels on certain days
and hours. These quotas are set to protect cinemas from competition by TV
channels.6 Quotas on investments require every TV channel to invest a
share of its resources in film production by “prepurchasing” or “coproduc-
ing” films, that is, 3 percent of the net turnover for French TV channels, 20
percent in the Canal Plus case (out of which 9 percent are French films).
Furthermore, there are additional rules imposing constraints on how
quickly a movie done for theaters can be programmed on TV channels and
sold as videos. These rules (which have been loosened in recent years) have
the same effect as quotas; that is, they artificially segment markets.
From an economic perspective, the key question is whether or not
these quotas are binding. The answer is no for the French quotas on the
total number of films that can be broadcast annually. These quotas have
been substantially increased over time, and they are close to the number
of broadcast films in EC member states not enforcing such a restriction.
However, the answer is yes for EC-based broadcast quotas on U.S. films.
For example, these quotas are strongly binding in France, where U.S.
films have a market share greater than 40 percent (ranging from 53 to 63
percent during the 1990s) in cinemas where French viewers can make
free choices.7 Similarly, investment quotas that contribute to increased
production of French films are binding.40 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
However, these instruments of protection have not had the expected pos-
itive impact on French films. For instance, not enough French films are pro-
duced to meet the quota of French films to be broadcast during TV prime
time. From 1994 to 2001, there have been, on average, only eleven French
films per year having enough success in cinemas (more than one million
viewers) to be candidates for broadcast during prime time—compared with
an average of twenty-four U.S. films. As a result, TV channels increasingly
show reruns of old French films (the rerun rate has increased from less than
60 percent in the 1980s to 70 percent in the 1990s) to meet the annual 40
percent quota of French films and fiction TV works—relegating recent
French films to late or early hours of the day.
Subsidies: Men in Black. Table 9 shows that all EC member states imple-
ment massive subsidy schemes. In 2000, with supports amounting to
368 million euros for films and audiovisual works (films made for TV
channels in EC jargon), France outdistanced other European countries.
(In what follows, euros will be used for ECUs as well as for euros.) Since
1997, the gap has somewhat narrowed. In 2000, the amount of the
TABLE 9
EUROPEAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FILM AND AUDIOVISUAL WORKS, 2000
Total Productiona Distribution Exploitation
million euros  %   %   %  
Austria  16.4   90  10   
Belgium  18.4   92.4  7.6   
Britain  57.5   96.5  1  2.5  
Denmark  23.3   91  8.2 0.8  
Finland  12.4   90  4.4  5.6  
France 368.1    82.1  5.4  12.5 
Germany 149.6    90  8.4  1.6   
Greece  3.8    100 0 0 
Ireland  8    99 1 0   
Italy 94.5    89.9  10.1  0 
Netherlands  34    99.4 0.6 0   
Portugal  17.2   92.2  0  7.3  
Spain 80    98.6 1.1 0.3   
Sweden 36.7    78  22  b
EC-15  921.3   88.3  6.2  5.5        
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 2002, vol. 3 (Strasbourg, France), 102.
a. Includes scriptwriting and development schemes and project development.
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French subsidies represented 39.9 percent of total European funds, com-
pared with 45.6 percent in 1997. Nevertheless, French public support
still exceeds by far the support granted by Germany, Britain, Italy, and
Spain, all countries known for their interventionist policies on this mat-
ter. Note that table 9 underestimates the differences between France and
the other EC member states because the figures provided on French pub-
lic support do not fully take into account the implicit support imposed
by the investment quota regime (which is much more important in
France than in any other European country). 
Table 10 addresses this implicit subsidy issue for French films
(excluding audiovisual works) for the period between 1995 and 2000.8
It gives two estimates of the subsidization rate, which differ with their
treatment of the income that film producers derive from TV purchases.
Estimate 1 includes in the film industry income the full expenses on
purchased and prepurchased films made by TV channels. However, part
of these TV purchases are imposed by the regulatory framework, namely
broadcasting and investment quotas. This component should thus be
considered as implicit subsidies granted by TV channels to French film
producers. Because it ignores this more appropriate interpretation, esti-
mate 1 undervalues somewhat the subsidization rate to French films.
Estimate 2 aims to correct this bias by using Cocq’s estimate,9 according
to which 41 percent of broadcasters’ investments are imposed by the
existing regulations. Consequently, 131.2 million euros should be
deducted from the income from TV channels and reported as public
support.
Table 10 suggests that during the late 1990s, the subsidization rate of
the French cinema exceeded 50 percent, according to the unbiased 
TABLE 10
SUBSIDIZATION RATES OF THE FRENCH FILM INDUSTRY, 1995–2000
M€, annual average during the period  Estimate 1  Estimate 2  
Public aid to cinema  187.7  318.9  
Movie theater income of French films  259.6  259.6  
TV income of French films 326.6  195.4  
Video income of French films  69.3  69.3 
Export income of French films  82  82  
Average subsidies rate of French films   25.5%  52.6%  
SOURCE: Centre National de la Cinématographie, Annual Reports, 1995–2000 (Paris); authors’ calculations.42 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
estimate 2. However, this rate is likely to be substantially lower than the
true rate because it is based on film revenues (and not on the added
value, as it should be) and it does not take into account a variety of
funds, in particular SOFICA’s tax-based incentive scheme for private
investment in film production, and—much more importantly—Canal
Plus monopoly rent. With an average spending of 130 million euros per
year in the late 1990s, Canal Plus alone contributed to two-thirds of all
funds flowing from investment quotas.10 This huge investment require-
ment has been explicitly conceived as a counterpart of the monopoly
granted to Canal Plus for broadcasting films in pay TV. In the 1990s, the
monopoly rents that Canal Plus could extract from its French TV view-
ers was estimated to be 300 million euros per year, meaning that almost
half of Canal Plus monopoly rents is an indirect way of taxing French TV
viewers in order to subsidize French film producers.11 If one adds all
these subsidies, the rate of subsidization of French films is close to 100
percent.
This regime deserves a last, but crucial, observation. Skyrocketing
subsidies have profoundly shaped film production away from culture.
The standardization of “automatic” production subsidies calculated on
admissions in cinemas, introduced by the “Plan Lang” (from former
Culture Minister Jack Lang) in 1989, has fueled the production of
French “entertainment” films mimicking high-cost Hollywood movies.
Combined with broadcast quotas, such subsidies have protected
French-made Hollywood clones from their Hollywood competitors,
leading to an accelerated “Americanization” of the French film output
and hurting the production of cultural films—all the more because the
very limited subsidies for such movies are granted by quasi-corporatist
committees favoring the fashion of the time more than creativity.
Winners and Losers: Four Funerals and a Wedding
European CAPs are so complex that operators in audiovisual markets
want to stick to the status quo simply because they cannot assess
whether they will lose or gain in the case of reforms. Fear of being
among the net losers of liberalization nurtures everybody’s hostility to
reforms, whereas the complexity of the protection is likely to have gen-
erated so many inefficiencies that everybody is already a net loser. For
instance, the French version of the EC system of quotas, subsidies, andPREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    43
monopoly rents (created, then taxed and transferred) involves at least 
six different participants: cinema owners, film producers (foreign,
French successful, and French unsuccessful), broadcasters, and French
consumers.
Most of these operators do not know whether the existing regime
makes them net winners or losers. Cinema owners benefit from the
quota on the total number of films to be broadcast and from the subsi-
dies (both increase demand for cinema seats), whereas they bear the cost
of the 11 percent seat tax, which reduces this demand. U.S. filmmakers
face the seat tax and the 40 percent broadcast quota on U.S. films (both
reduce the demand of their films), but they recoup a portion of the seat
tax to the extent that they are the main beneficiaries of the relatively
comfortable French cinemas. EC filmmakers face the same situation as
U.S. film producers, with two differences: They have access to French
subsidies, but they are unlikely to benefit from possible rents associated
with the quota on EC films (their demand by French TV viewers is too
limited). Successful French film producers share many features with EC
filmmakers, and they get even more subsidies, leaving them with the
impression of being major beneficiaries (but perhaps wrongly, because
their situation in the absence of CAPs could be even better).
Broadcasters are “taxed” by investment quotas (and by taxes or fees on
their advertising resources), but they may benefit from these quotas to
the extent that they provide some flexibility in programming. Canal Plus
is an extreme case, with huge monopoly rents constrained by investment
quotas (with the rise of its competitor TPS increasingly deteriorating
Canal Plus’s net situation to the point that it could become a net loser in
the future).
There is only one group of sure winners and one group of sure losers.
Unsuccessful French filmmakers are unambiguously net winners: They are
not hurt by the seat tax (nobody wants to see their movies), and they are fully
subsidized. The larger their budgets are, the more they are winners. Ironically,
big-budget unsuccessful French-made clones of Hollywood films get the best
of the EC-French system. By contrast, the viewers of French films and the
French taxpayers are unambiguously net losers. They are taxed directly
(when funding subsidies) or indirectly (when going to movie cinemas or
when subscribing to Canal Plus), and French viewers who want to see U.S.
films are hurt by restrictions on these films, whereas French viewers inter-
ested in cultural films are hurt by minimal public support for this category of
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A System Slowly Losing Its Support: Titanic, Part II
In the late 1990s, the perception of the CAPs enforced in some member
states since the early 1980s, and generalized with the 1989 TWF
European Directive, dramatically changed. A profound sense of dissatis-
faction has emerged in all the member states, particularly in those imple-
menting strict CAPs, such as France. What follows documents this
evolution, underlining the fact that the much-publicized statement made
in December 2001 by Jean-Marie Messier, then head of Vivendi-Universal,
that “the Franco-French cultural exception is over,” is the end result of a
long process.
The unfairness of certain rules (and the ease with which they can be
manipulated by committees) has been the first source of increasing criti-
cism, as illustrated by the disputes on rules of origin discussed previously.
A few years ago, movies unduly classified as French films were denounced
in carefully balanced terms by Cour des Comptes but with no public
echo.12 In 1997, the above-mentioned highly controversial case of The Fifth
Element was widely covered by the film specialized press (which is closely
following the ongoing legal battle).
In 1998, the procedure for granting French origin to movies was
reformed, with the language criterion losing some of its influence. But the
changes have only generated new problems, as illustrated by a few recent
cases. In 2000, a Japanese-made cartoon was presented as a French
movie, fueling fierce criticisms in Le Monde.13 More recently, the film Un
long dimanche de fiançailles, directed by Jean-Pierre Jeunet (the director of
the very successful Le fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain), almost did not
receive French origin—despite the fact that it was shot in French and in
France, with French actors—because the producer of the film
(Production 2003) was a 40 percent subsidiary of the U.S. firm Warner.14
Opponents to granting French origin to the movie in question argued
that providing French subsidies to subsidiaries of U.S. filmmakers signi-
fied the end of the French cultural exception. Meanwhile, the movie
Alexander the Great by Oliver Stone (a U.S. director with a French pass-
port) was shot in English, with U.S. and British actors, but received
French origin without problem, even though it was funded by the French
firm Pathé only up to 20 percent.
Dissatisfaction has then grown concerning the production perform-
ance of the CAPs. During the early years of the system (the 1980s), the
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French audiovisual policy—it was an essential argument for “selling” the
French regime to the other EC member states. Of course, the fact that
French film production remained high—while film production was
declining (sometimes dramatically) in other EC member states—simply
mirrored the fact that more French public money was made available to
filmmakers and spent by them (once again, not necessarily for a cultural
purpose). As time went on and other EC member states implemented
their own version of the CAPs, their film industries began to produce
roughly the same number of films as France (between 80 and 130 films
per year for the largest member states), leading to the realization in
Europe that this indicator was largely meaningless.15
The disenchantment was then followed by a spreading recognition of
the uselessness of broadcast quotas in Europe, as underlined by the EC
Commission: “There [is] a pretty general consensus that broadcast quo-
tas no longer suited the new environment.”16 This perception has pene-
trated even the member states that have been historically the most
attached to this instrument. A series of interviews about audiovisual reg-
ulations before the Seattle WTO Ministerial revealed a definite change of
tone in France.17 Patrick Le Lay, head of the largest (private) TV channel,
TF1, was very clear about the fact that quotas have been made “obsolete”
by digitalization and the Internet, whereas Marc Tessier, head of the pub-
lic channel France Télévision, and Pierre Lescure, head of Canal Plus,
were in favor of “more flexibility” of the existing regime, leaving only
Rémy Sautter, head of CLT-UFA, in favor of quotas (but not of subsidies).
Declining public support for the quota regime in recent years mirrors
the increasing share of foreign films in cinema admissions. Until the late
1990s, the diverging evolutions of the shares of U.S. and domestic films in
France and other European countries (see table 11) were perceived as the
sign of success of the French film policy. In fact, however, as said above, the
high market share of domestic films in France was the mere consequence
of the massive French subsidies, relative to the support granted by other
countries. 
However, this difference has been vanishing during recent years, and
market shares of films by nationality tend to converge in all EC member
states (see table 12). The same can be said for the market shares for
domestic films (the dubious classification of The Fifth Element as a French
film increases the 1997 French film market share in France by 5 per-
centage points), and the recognition of a “commercial rout” in 1999 has
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A newly emerging source of dissatisfaction in France is the role of
subsidies. Until the very early 2000s, criticisms had been limited to the
subsidy pattern, with certain observers finding the subsidy share granted
to distribution to be excessive, with a notable exception in a weekly
newspaper.19 But sweeping criticism erupted unexpectedly with a hot
debate between directors and film critics. In a paper published in one of
the major French newspapers, certain directors bitterly accused film
TABLE 11
EC AUDIOVISUAL MARKETS: CINEMAS, TV CHANNELS, AND VIDEOS,
1996–1997
Theatersa TV channelsb Videos ______________ ______________ ______________
U.S. VCR
U.S. EC U.S. fiction penetration Blank
films films films works ratec  cassettesd
1994–97 1997  1996  1996  1997  1997   
Austria  —   0.0  64.6  26.6   75.3  4.7  
Belgium  71.9  0.1   34.1  31.1   68.4  4.1  
Britain 80.5  4.8 e 75.3  19.8   83.0  3.1  
Denmark  70.2  0.2   65.6  27.4   79.0  5.0  
Finland  72.7  0.1   67.0  14.8   72.2  4.4  
France  55.7 10.2    36.2 18.9  77.5  6.3   
Germany  78.6  3.7   65.2  35.5   77.3  3.4  
Greece  —  0.0   —  20.2  55.7  1.5  
Ireland  —  0.0   —  27.1   72.7  2.1  
Italy  59.9  2.2   61.6  23.6   59.2  2.3 
Netherlands 86.6  0.2   72.4  22.7   67.3  4.0  
Portugal  80.8  0.1  —  19.0   52.0  1.3  
Spain  72.7  1.9  69.0  28.1   72.1  1.9  
Sweden  67.2  0.4  —  29.7   79.2  4.9  
EC f  72.4  1.7 61.1  24.6  73.6 3.5 
United States  95.4  —   —  —   92.8  —  
Japan 41.3  —  —  —  90.8  — 
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1998, 1999 (Strasbourg, 
France). 
a. In percentage of total entrances.
b. In percentage of hours broadcasted (weighted by audience).
Data for U.S. films are available only for 1996 (for comparison, data for U.S. fiction 
works for the same year are presented).
c. In percentage of households. 
d. Expenditures in current euro per person. 
e. The 1997 share is 8.7 percent if coproduced British-U.S. films are included as EC films. 
f. EC simple averages of the columns (based on the 15 member states) are indicated by italics.PREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    47
critics of “premeditated assassinations” and of wanting “to kill off all
commercial French cinema designed for a mass audience.”20 The article
generated an outcry, which leads to two key observations. First, direc-
tors producing small-budget cultural films did not endorse the stated
accusations (as the quote shows, the article referred to “commercial”
films), whereas directors specializing in “pure” entertainment movies
did not intervene in the controversy. This clear split among directors of
three types of films (“pure” entertainment, cultural, and “in-between”) is
crucial not only because it underlines that problems are concentrated in
the “in-between” segment of the French production, but because, as
argued above, it provides a basis for designing a worldwide acceptable
subsidy regime. Second, the debate offered an opportunity for many
commentators to criticize “a protection of film makers which has
reached such a level that its beneficiaries are no more able to tolerate the
least criticism,”21 at last opening the door to criticisms of the existing
subsidy scheme in the French press.22
Interestingly, doubts on the efficiency of the French subsidy scheme
have very recently begun to emerge among official circles, as best illus-
trated by a very recent report from the French Senate.23
These criticisms have not reached the EC subsidy regime (as distinct
from member states’ subsidies), which is still widely perceived as bene-
ficial despite the fact that the demand for European nondomestic films
in each EC member state (for instance, the demand for EC non-French
films in France) is not only small but also generally declined during the
1990s. This evolution suggests that the EC subsidy regime is self-
destructing because CAPs constitute a barrier to an integrated EC film
market, contrary to its stated objective. This is not surprising. National
subsidies have artificially bolstered film production by “gluing”—the
idea that investments are stuck in each member state, instead of looking
to the best places in Europe—national investments in each member
state. Rather than creating a demand for so-called “European” films,
these “sticky” investments in a member state have been crowding out
films from other EC member states. Ironically, the French film industry
has suffered the largest crowding-out effect. In sharp contrast, the only
EC film industry with growing market shares in the EC is the British
industry, which has been characterized by a much lower level of subsi-
dization for years (to a large extent, forcing it not to mimic U.S. films but
to offer a British touch) and noticeable investments from the U.S. film
industry in recent years.48 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
TABLE 12
EC AUDIOVISUAL POLICIES: A BARRIER TO A EUROPEAN FILM MARKET
Origin of first-time 
Market share of films from: release feature films
Britain 
(market share of gross box office)  Britain ____________________________ ____________________________
1992 6.8 90.6 — 1.0 0.1 0.0 11 59.9 — 6.6 0.9 0.9
1993  2.5  94.2  —   0.7  0.0  0.0   10.2  57.2  —   6.4 0.8  0.8
1994  8.8  90.2  —   0.5  0.0 0.0   15.8  58.9  —   5.4  1.3  2.0
1995  10.5  85.2 —   0.5  0.0  0.2   16.3  60.7  —   5.0  1.0  1.7
1996  12.8  81.7  —   0.5  0.0  0.2   18.7  59.8  —   6.6  0.6  0.6
1997 28.1  69.3  —   0.2  0.0  0.0   23.5  57.1  —   5.7  0.6  1.2
1998  14.2  83.7  —   0.2  0.0  0.0   20.5  53.4 —   5.9  1.1  0.0
1999  17.8  80.5  —   0.2  0.1  0.5   23.3  52.8  —   5.3  1.4  0.8
2000  21.4  75.3  —   0.3  0.0  0.0   21.4  51.9  —   6.0  0.5  0.8
Italy 
(market share of gross box office)   Italy ____________________________ ____________________________
1992  24.4  59.4  6.1  4.5  0.2  —    26.1  47.8  7.1  6.6  2.3  —
1993  17.3  70.0  4.7  3.4  1.0  —    27.8  52.0  4.2  5.0  1.6  —
1994  23.7  61.1  6.7  3.2  1.8  —    27.5  50.0  5.2  5.5  1.4 —
1995  21.1  63.2  6.4  4.0  0.7  —    22.0  52.5  6.2  6.7  1.2  —
1996  24.9  59.7  5.9  2.5  0.1  —    26.6  48.9  8.3  6.5  0.8  —
1997  32.9  46.7  10.8  4.0  0.4  —    22.9  47.9  9.7  6.8  1.1  —
1998  24.7  63.8  7.4  2.2  0.2  —    24.0  47.8  8.9  8.1  1.6  —
1999  24.1  53.1  13.8  2.7  0.4  —    24.8  43.1  10.9  9.2  1.0  —
2000  17.5  69.6  3.3  5.8  1.1  —   20.1  45.6  —   —   —   —
Spain 
(market share of gross box office)   Spain ____________________________ ____________________________
1992  9.3  77.1  3.9  4.0 2.6  1.2   11.3  53.5  6.6  8.8  1.6  6  
1993  8.8  75.7  4.1  3.9  1.5  0.4   18.3  51.3  6.2  7.5  4.9  3.3  
1994  7.1  72.3  8.7  3.2 2.3  0.3   12.8  52.8  8.7  6.1  9.0  2.0  
1995  12.2  71.9  7.3  2.9  1.1  0.6   14.1  45.8  7.9  7.7  10.6  4.1  
1996  9.3  78.2  5.8  2.7  0.4  1.6   17.7  39.5  5.2  6.7  5.2  1.9  
1997  13.1  68.2  12.6  2.6  0.7  0.4   16.6  44.1  9.1  6.0  13.3  2.3  
1998  11.9  78.5  5.8  0.9  0.5  0.3   13.0  47.9  8.0 5.4  13.2  1.8  
1999  13.8  64.4  10.8  3.2  0.6  3.5   17.1  45.1  9.8  7.3  11.7 2.1  
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Regulatory Reforms and Liberalization: Shakespeare in Love
The above evidence leads to the conclusion that domestic regulatory
reforms are much needed. Thus, this section looks at two issues: Why
have almost no reforms been launched? What could be the desirable
reforms?
TABLE 12 (continued)
EC AUDIOVISUAL POLICIES: A BARRIER TO A EUROPEAN FILM MARKET
Origin of first-time 
Market share of films from: release feature films
Germany 
(market share of gross box office)  Germany ____________________________ ____________________________
1992  9.5 82.8 2.5 2.7 —    0.2    21.9 45.1 7.3 8.7 —    4.2   
1993  7.2 87.8 1.1 2.0 —    0.1    25.5 49.4 5.3 8.0 —    0.4   
1994 10.1 81.6 4.8 1.5 —    0.1    22.8 50.2 6.8 7.2 —    1.1   
1995  6.3 87.1 2.2 1.7 —    0.1    24.2 51.9 5.0 5.0 —    1.5   
1996 15.3 75.1 7.0 1.0 —    0.1    22.3 52.3 4.9 6.3 —    1.0   
1997 17.3 70.5 8.5 2.9 —    0.1    21.3 47.2 8.4 7.3 —    1.0   
1998  8.1 85.4 5.2 0.7 —    0.3    16.9 56.9 6.4 5.4 —    2.4
1999  11.1  78.6  —   0.7  —   —    —   —   —   —   —   —
2000  9.4  81.9  —   0.9  —   —    —   —   —   —   —   — 
France 
(market share of gross box office)  France ____________________________ ____________________________
1992 35.0 58.2 1.6 —    0.6  0.8    41.6 30.2 3.0 —   1.2  2.5
1993 35.1 57.1 2.7 —    0.3  0.2    38.9 34.1 3.8 —   2.5  1.8   
1994 28.3 60.9 7.0 —    0.5  0.2    35.6 35.9 3.4 —   1.2  2.2   
1995 35.2 53.9 6.5 —    1.1  0.1    36.3 35.0 4.5 —   2.5  2.0   
1996 37.5 54.3 5.1 —    0.4  0.1    38.9 36.3 5.2 —   1.8  1.3   
1997 34.5 52.2 8.9 —    0.2  0.2    38.3 36.8 6.3 —   1.5  3.3   
1998 27.6 63.2 4.5 —    0.2  2.1    38.6 35.5 8.3 —   2.0  1.1   
1999 32.4 53.9 8.7 —    0.6  0.9    39.8 34.1 5.3 —   1.5  2.1   
2000 28.5 62.9 4.7 —    0.6  0.4    38.2 35.7 6.8 —   1.7  1.7   
2001a 41.5 46.4 5.7 —    0.9  0.3    40.3 32.0 6.3 —   2.2  0.8 
SOURCE: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 2001 (Strasbourg, France). 
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Explaining Inertia: Citizen Kane. There are several explanations of why
almost no reforms have been established. First, there is the sheer impor-
tance of the media for politicians. Media professionals (for example, film
directors and actors) are, by definition, masters of public relations. Their
skills make them particularly apt at exerting powerful pressures on gov-
ernments, as illustrated in 1998 by a few European film directors, who
were able to provide the “coup de grâce” to the OECD-based Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), despite the fact that it was already clear
that audiovisual services were excluded from the MAI coverage.24
Because audiovisual services are an essential tool of the day-to-day rela-
tions between the “rulers” and the “people,” government officials need
the expertise of media professionals on a regular basis. This gives these
producers much more influence than their economic weight would sug-
gest. (Increases in audiovisual subsidies are significantly correlated with
French major elections.)
Second is the much-entrenched belief that CAPs are necessary for creat-
ing “quality” movies. There is no evidence to support such a belief, as
shown by the two (admittedly crude) indicators for French films. The first
indicator is based on the TV audience. As stressed previously, the lightly
subsidized French films produced before the 1980s attract, even nowadays
(despite the handicap of many reruns), many more viewers during prime
time TV hours than the heavily subsidized films produced during the
1980s and 1990s—such a difference in attractiveness is not observed for
recent U.S. films. The second indicator assumes that the only people who
can recognize the virtues of French cultural films are those who attend film
festivals. If this assumption is correct, the French “share of awards” in the
three major European film festivals (Berlin, Cannes, and Venice) seems a
crude, but acceptable, indicator of the evolution of the quality of French
films. This share has dramatically decreased from roughly 20 percent
(1981–1986) to 8 percent (1987–1994 and 1995–2000), if one does not
include the Cannes Festival. (Including Cannes confirms the decline dur-
ing the two first periods, from 16 percent to 10 percent but shows an
increase to 14 percent during the third period.) All this does not support a
strong correlation between the CAPs and “quality” movies.
These results are not surprising for economists who regard changes in
artistic quality as largely exogenous to public policies. They may even
expect the CAPs to have a negative effect on quality for the following rea-
sons. Broadcast quotas tend to induce TV firms to produce more domes-
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broadcast, making quality a marginal preoccupation. Subsidies change
the trade-off between quantity and quality by anesthetizing filmmakers’
risk assessment, as indirectly revealed by the much higher ratio of films
to viewers in France compared with the United States (there are roughly
1.1 films produced per million annual viewers in France, compared with
0.4 films per million in the United States).
Third, the balkanization of EC audiovisual markets by the many quotas,
subsidies, and monopolies (public and private) introduced by the CAPs has
left EC audiovisual firms with two main strategic options. The first is to
replicate the EC system in Central Europe by establishing additional
monopolies—an option relatively easy to implement but with very low
returns (because of the smallness of the available markets) and with the
costs of increasingly hostile environments. (Why should Estonians be
happy to grant monopoly rights and rents to French or German TV firms?)
The alternative option is to become global (world) firms. However, that
requires such large funds that it cannot be done alone by EC audiovisual
firms (which are small and underfunded). Going global makes sense only
for EC audiovisual firms that are part of much larger and diversified com-
panies; however, this option is still very risky, as best illustrated by the inte-
gration of Universal Studios or even Canal Plus in Vivendi.
Last but not least, the absence of proposals for the liberalization of
audiovisual services reflects the above-mentioned fact that audiovisual
services companies do not know whether the existing policies make them
net winners or losers, leaving no constituency for change.
Three Proposals: Le fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain. The three
reforms discussed here are a preparatory step for multilateral negotiations
and could improve the situation for both the entertainment- and cultur-
ally oriented audiovisual services sectors among WTO members. The
reforms focus on the EC, but because all the suggestions are consistent
with the letter and, more importantly, the spirit of the WTO, they also
could be considered by other countries. Reforms should aim to eliminate
the waste of European resources for making entertainment and to provide
a much better environment for culture—a de facto, much neglected
aspect in the existing CAPs. 
The first proposal is to dismantle the CAPs quota regime. Justifying this
action in a narrow WTO context—the highly discriminatory content of
this regime—would miss the main reason of such an action: The existing
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discussed previously, such quotas hurt every market participant, except
the producers of bad domestic films. They create monopolies (hence inef-
ficiencies) through price hikes or quantity restrictions, and as a result, they
call for subsidies to be sustainable in the long run (at a large cost to pub-
lic treasuries). The CAPs quota regime could be dismantled in three ways:
merging domestic and other member state film categories into one
(“European”) category in the broadcast quotas, increasing the share of
non-EC films in the broadcast quotas, and reducing the investment quo-
tas (and eliminating the constraints of these quotas). The sequence of
these measures should be examined carefully (ideally, the reduction of the
distortions in the film markets per se should precede the reduction of the
distortions in the investment domain in order to avoid the misallocation
of investment resources in the most protected markets).
The second proposal is to make a distinction between subsidies for enter-
tainment and subsidies for culture, eliminating the former and allowing 
the latter. Eliminating quotas but keeping subsidies for all kinds of films 
(a policy often suggested in Europe) would be inappropriate. The previously
mentioned French debate between directors and critics shows that 
entertainment films can survive without state subsidies, but cultural films
cannot, and the ambiguous case of “in-between” movies is not a serious
obstacle to this distinction because most of these films have little cultural
content. At first glance, such a proposal seems drastic and to have little
chance of succeeding in Europe. However, the situation is changing.
Eroding monopoly rents within member states’ markets (such as for Canal
Plus) will inevitably undermine a large source of subsidies. Declining mar-
ket shares of European films in European markets will force operators in
the film market to recognize that subsidies generate barriers rather than
create a single market.
Subsidies for cultural films do not raise any problem of principle about
their compatibility with the rules of the WTO. The direct and indirect
effects of such subsidies on film trade are minimal because such films tend
to have limited audiences and are not a substitute for entertainment films.
The source of subsidies does not seem to be a serious problem in the WTO
framework. Funding through the general tax system (or a proxy for gen-
eral tax, such as the British National Lottery, which may be seen as superior
to funding through public budget because it is more transparent) is nondis-
criminatory. Funding through a seat tax can be treated as (partially) equiv-
alent to a tariff, which is an instrument easily negotiable in multilateral
trade negotiations.PREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    53
Such subsidies raise two problems of implementation. First is the
instrument that will allow their introduction to the WTO framework.
The solution seems to be a “reference paper” defining the conditions of
competition in films, that is, allowing subsidies for cultural films and
prohibiting them for other types of films. The second problem is to pre-
vent filmmakers from improperly using subsidies for films other than
cultural films. Such a problem is not serious in countries acting in good
faith, because the distinction between entertainment and cultural films
is easy to make and because cultural films rarely require large funds. For
instance, French subsidies to cultural films amount (by all possible stan-
dards) to less than 30 percent of the total amount of public subsidies.
But the problem does exist in the absence of good faith behavior by
some WTO members. To monitor this risk, WTO member states should
be requested to notify an agreed international body of their subsidies—
perhaps an embarrassing exercise because it might reveal how amazingly
little countries invest in their culture (and how culture is an excuse for
sheer protectionism of narrow domestic economic interests).
The third proposal deals with the serious, and fundamentally domestic,
issues raised by an efficient regime of subsidies for cultural films, that is, of
an efficient “patronage.” Such issues are completely ignored by the existing
CAPs. To what extent can democratic institutions (that is, elected repre-
sentatives and government officials) and associated bureaucracies (such as
the French Centre National de la Cinématographie) be effective “patrons”?
Being a patron implies the willingness to take risks and be ready to pay for
the possible mistakes and corresponding losses. In democracies, represen-
tatives and government officials are intrinsically reluctant to take risks
because they could be accused of favoritism. In addition, they never pay for
their errors—the taxpayers do. Under these conditions, it is difficult for
public authorities to promote culture directly (except in the narrow sense
of preserving uncontroversial historical items and landmarks).
As a result, a serious treatment of culture in the film industry (as well as
in other arts) requires adequate domestic regulations for art foundations
and for innovative structures for patronage (for example, the British system
of “franchised units”). Each country should make an in-depth examination
of its capacity to provide the appropriate regulations and institutions for the
support of its culture. These are purely domestic problems, and such reg-
ulations and institutions are unlikely to raise a problem with the WTO
principle of nondiscrimination. In fact, a patron of French culture could 
be a U.S. institution or person (as in the late 1800s and early 1900s, with54 THE AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SECTOR IN THE GATS NEGOTIATIONS
the U.S. tycoons and French Impressionists), and filmmakers producing
movies nurtured by and enriching French culture could be natives of other
countries.
In conclusion, none of these three proposals threatens “culture” or 
the WTO. To the contrary, they all offer opportunities to design better
mechanisms for patronage than the defaulting ones on which the existing
protectionist policies rely. The WTO is perfectly fitted for discussing the
issue of culturally oriented subsidies (and other competition-related
issues) in a reference paper specific to audiovisual services. There is no
need to go to another international forum.
Postscript: And the Kiwis Came 
The following postscript addresses four issues that emerged between the
Uruguay and the Doha Rounds—during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
First, during the Uruguay Round, Hollywood was dominant in enter-
tainment movies and fiction TV shows. Today, Hollywood retains its
unique capacity to produce movies that are seen in cinemas all over the
world—it is a major European preconception that Hollywood aims to pro-
duce only “American” movies. However, the situation has evolved in the
fiction TV segment. The existence of a much larger number of European
broadcasters has generated a strong demand for more differentiated pro-
grams based on more local content (local actors, scenery). Because skills for
making fiction TV shows are easier to learn, and digitalization has made
equipment less expensive, TV programs can target national audiences and
still be profitable. To keep their previous positions, U.S. firms have had to
make joint TV shows with non-U.S. firms.
Second, the costs of making Hollywood films in the United States have
skyrocketed, inducing Hollywood filmmakers to shoot their movies out-
side U.S. territory. Requests for protecting audiovisual interests in the
United States against “runaway productions” have emerged, as illustrated
by a dispute between the United States and Canada over American
movies being shot in Canada. What was at stake was (explicitly) “the
small business that supports the film industry, . . . caterers, rental equip-
ment business, electricians, etc.”25 and not, for example, the authors,
directors, actors, and scriptwriters, that is, all the sources of culture.
Third, digitalization has created huge possibilities for creating images,
including “virtual” images, at low cost. Countries that have not previouslyPREPARING NEGOTIATIONS IN SERVICES    55
been involved in audiovisual production—but have workers who have
digitalization skills and untapped natural resources—have been able to
attract large productions, as best illustrated by The Lord of the Rings,
which was mostly produced in New Zealand. (Interestingly, this movie is
considered to be of U.S. origin in most countries, but of New Zealand 
origin by the French authorities.) As a result, competition between pos-
sible places to shoot films and fiction TV shows has tremendously
increased.
Fourth, the strengthening of the Internet-based economy has dramati-
cally changed the market prospects for cultural films. The Internet is a very
cheap and widespread means of disseminating cultural films, which, by
nature, tend to attract geographically dispersed audiences. Forces in the EC
that want to extend to Internet-related audiovisual services the barriers and
restrictions imposed on audiovisual services channeled by other means of
communication are suicidal from the cultural point of view. In terms of the
audiovisual services sector, the EC probably has more to gain from an
untaxed and free Internet than the United States does.
Interestingly, all these issues challenge the U.S. comparative advan-
tages in movies shown in cinemas—there is no such thing as producers
with permanent advantages. As a result, they favor situations that can be
seen by negotiators as more “balanced” between market operators in the
United States, the EC, and elsewhere; hence, if more frequent and recog-
nized, these evolving comparative advantages could make negotiations
on audiovisual services at the WTO easier.56
Conclusion
The audiovisual services sector in the Doha Round is significantly dif-
ferent from the audiovisual services sector of the Uruguay Round, in
which negotiations focused primarily on film production, film distribu-
tion, and global broadcasting of audiovisual services. We come unani-
mously to the conclusion that new technologies and worldwide access
to a multitude of entertainment and information services have stimulated
the growth and development of audiovisual services and products from
around the globe. Siwek proposes a proactive role in taking advantage of
the global technological changes and suggests that the United States
develop a reference paper that focuses on the distribution of audiovisual
products over the Internet. Messerlin and Cocq optimistically outline
the ongoing profound economic and technological changes in the large
EC film markets.
Moreover, note that both Messerlin and Cocq stress the fact that only
a limited group of WTO member states, including the United States, has
taken substantial positive commitments at the various stages of audiovi-
sual production, distribution, and transmission. Siwek emphasizes in
this context that MFN exemptions to the GATS should be seen as tem-
porary in nature contrary to the EU view, which characterizes its cultural
exemption to MFN as “indefinite.” Messerlin and Cocq stress the balka-
nization of EC audiovisual markets by the many quotas, subsidies, and
monopolies (public and private) introduced by the CAPs. They make
the point that “reforms should eliminate the waste of European
resources for making entertainment and provide a much better environ-
ment for culture.”
Countries have committed themselves to progressive liberalization
negotiations under the GATS in all services sectors, including audiovi-
sual services. The difficulty in achieving progress related to audiovisual
services derives from the fact that the sector is unique and that the GATS
mechanism may not be sufficient to address the specifics of this sector.
To achieve progress in GATS negotiations, negotiators should reach anCONCLUSION    57
outcome that provides a mechanism to address different countries’ con-
cerns. The outcome of negotiations could result in a protocol that would
establish rules for the use of subsidies, protect intellectual property
rights, and contain provisions on how to protect culture by way of link-
ages with relevant cultural agreements. 59
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